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 The Grip of Nationalism on Corporate Law 
MARIANA PARGENDLER* 
INTRODUCTION  
After decades of increased economic integration, nationalistic sentiment and 
protectionist policies are back in vogue, raising questions about the future of 
globalization. This tension is not new, but it matters. Countries have long adopted 
different and changing attitudes towards free trade or the protection of local 
industries, with significant economic and social repercussions. The current 
resurgence of nationalist impulses in the face of globalization may well be “the 
struggle of our time.”1  
There is a long-running debate about the effects of globalization on corporate 
governance. Proponents of the convergence thesis have argued that, by increasing 
competition in product and capital markets, globalization would push countries to 
adopt efficient corporate governance practices that privilege the interests of outside 
investors, possibly leading to the “end of history for corporate law.”2 Skeptics have 
at most warned that path dependence and interest group pressure will permit some 
persistence of traditional differences in corporate governance despite the powerful 
forces of globalization and efficiency.3 Both camps focus on the role of corporate 
law in reducing agency costs, but diverge about whether a single efficient model will 
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 1. Sarah Frier, Zuckerberg Asks Harvard Grads to Fight Isolationism, Nationalism, 
BLOOMBERG (May 25, 2017, 4:43 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-05-
25/zuckerberg-asks-harvard-grads-to-fight-isolationism-nationalism [https://perma.cc/9PJJ-
7RHH]; Yuval Noah Harari & Chris Anderson, Nationalism vs. Globalism: The New Political 
Divide, TED (Feb. 2017), https://www.ted.com/talks/yuval_noah_harari_nationalism_vs 
_globalism_the_new_political_divide [https://perma.cc/9L8R-SHSP]. 
 2. See, e.g., Jeffrey N. Gordon & Mark J. Roe, Introduction, in CONVERGENCE AND 
PERSISTENCE IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 1–2 (Jeffrey N. Gordon & Mark J. Roe eds., 2004); 
Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 
439 (2001); see also Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, The Great Reversals: The Politics 
of Financial Development in the Twentieth Century, 69 J. FIN. ECON. 5 (2003) (providing an 
influential empirical study suggesting that incumbents will oppose financial development 
when the economy is closed but not when it is open to cross-border trade and capital flows). 
 3. See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Mark J. Roe, A Theory of Path Dependence in 
Corporate Ownership and Governance, 52 STAN. L. REV. 127 (1999).  
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emerge given the existing differences in ownership structures and in the power of 
distinct interest groups.  
Yet, this prevailing debate has overlooked key elements in the structure of 
national politics and the role of corporate arrangements as an instrument and 
expression of economic nationalism. In this Article, I document and explain the 
pervasive influence of nationalist impulses in shaping corporate law around the 
world and throughout history—a phenomenon which I term “the grip of nationalism 
on corporate law.” This effort shows that nationalist influence on corporate law is 
old, widespread, and resilient, and has put sand in the gears of globalization.  
Nationalism—here understood as the political resolve to favor territorial insiders 
over outsiders through protectionist policies4—has left an imprint on the most 
important features of the governance landscape, ranging from ownership structures 
and takeover defenses to choice of law and investor protection. The use of corporate 
law mechanisms to ensure domestic control of business corporations has been 
particularly salient. France and Germany first embraced multivoting and nonvoting 
stock in the early twentieth century to ward off foreign domination of local 
companies. A key motive behind state ownership of enterprise in most jurisdictions, 
from Norway to Brazil, is to ensure domestic control and headquarters of strategic 
industries. Fears of foreign acquisitions have profoundly shaped takeover legislation 
worldwide, to the point that numerous legal reforms bear the name of a conspicuous 
foreign bidder, such as the “Danone amendment” in France, the “Lactalis decree” in 
Italy, and the “Cadbury law” in the United Kingdom. 
We do not usually think of U.S. corporate law as reflecting nationalist concerns, 
but analogous forces of state-level patriotism (or statism, rather than nationalism, if 
you will) have fundamentally shaped its course. U.S. firms have repeatedly obtained 
state antitakeover legislation in response to hostile threats by out-of-state bidders. 
Nationalist discourse against foreign ownership has also occasionally left a mark on 
U.S. federal legislation, from the charter provisions disenfranchising foreign 
investors in the First and Second Bank of the United States in the nineteenth century 
to the enactment of regulatory restrictions on hostile takeovers in the Williams Act 
of 1968.  
 
 
 4. For a similar loose use of nationalism as the rough equivalent of “economic 
nationalism,” “protectionism,” and “economic patriotism” for ease of recognition, see Helen 
Callaghan, Economic Nationalism, Network-Based Coordination, and the Market for 
Corporate Control: Motives for Political Resistance to Foreign Takeovers (Max-Planck-
Institut für Gesellschaftsforschung, Working Paper No. 12/10, 2012). Because this definition 
is sufficiently broad to encompass subnational or supranational political unities, a more 
accurate, though less used, term would be economic patriotism. See Ben Clift & Cornelia 
Woll, Economic Patriotism: Reinventing Control over Open Markets, 19 J. EUR. PUB. POL’Y 
307, 308 (2012) (“Unlike economic nationalism, economic patriotism is agnostic about the 
precise nature of the unit claimed as patrie: it can also refer to supranational or sub-national 
economic citizenship.”). However, unlike the conception of nationalism used in this Article, 
Clift and Woll’s definition of economic patriotism is neutral as to its policy content, thus 
allowing for the pursuit of economic patriotism through liberal economic policies so long as 
they are meant to favor citizens over foreigners. Id. at 309, 313. 
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Nationalist or integrationist objectives, rather than the agency cost considerations 
that dominate the literature, are the proximate cause of corporate reforms with 
surprising frequency. Although the influence of nationalism on corporate governance 
reforms is not a new theme (nor could it be, given how often it is invoked in public 
discourse), existing accounts of the phenomenon are rare. The few case studies of 
individual countries that do touch on this subject leave the false impression that the 
interaction between nationalism and corporate law is jurisdiction specific,5 or of 
modest importance.6 In fact, it is ubiquitous and consequential, and therefore worthy 
of systematic attention.  
At least three factors promote the grip of nationalism on corporate law: 
The political deficit of foreigners. Because only citizens vote, the political 
economy of corporate governance, as of everything else, is tilted against foreign 
interests. In the absence of international coordination, legal outcomes tend to favor 
domestic parties over foreign ones and local welfare over global welfare. In the 
corporate governance arena, lawmakers tend to privilege the interests of domestic 
managers, controlling shareholders, and workers over those of foreign investors. 
Although the political deficit of foreigners is well known in international law (and 
has led to the proliferation of bilateral investment treaties seeking to protect foreign 
investors from subsequent expropriation), the corporate governance literature has 
completely ignored it to date. Instead, it assumes that globalization will inexorably 
push countries to offer ever-greater protection to foreign investors.  
The powerful alliance of domestic forces. The pursuit of nationalist policies 
through corporate law benefits from the powerful domestic alliance between elite 
and labor interests in retaining local corporate control and the popular appeal of 
nationalist sentiment. Corporate takeovers can be unpopular, but foreign takeovers 
are far more likely to trigger commotion and political action. To succeed, the pursuit 
of nationalism through corporate law need not be genuine or welfare enhancing; 
nationalism often can and does serve as a smokescreen for purely private interests.7 
However, it is not easy to dismiss nationalist arguments as purely empty or 
opportunistic rhetoric. The existing evidence on the economic impact of foreign 
direct investment and foreign takeovers is mixed, adding a patina of legitimacy to 
nationalist corporate laws.8 
The use of corporate law as stealth protectionism. Constitutional commitments to 
economic integration and international concerns over reciprocity favor the use of 
 
 
 5. The conflation of nationalism with individual countries’ national histories—and, 
therefore, the neglect of nationalism as a systematic phenomenon—is also common among 
historians. John Breuilly, Introduction: Concepts, Approaches, Theories, in THE OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF THE HISTORY OF NATIONALISM 1 (John Breuilly ed., 2013) (“Nationalism is 
treated by professional historians as one aspect of national history rather than a subject in its 
own right.”). 
 6. To be sure, the role of nationalist impulses is a recurrent theme in E.U. corporate 
law—not least because its primary goal is precisely to overcome protectionist tendencies to 
promote economic integration. For a prominent collection of works examining the 
developments in the 2000s, see COMPANY LAW AND ECONOMIC PROTECTIONISM: NEW 
CHALLENGES TO EUROPEAN INTEGRATION (Ulf Bernitz & Wolf-Georg Ringe eds., 2010). 
 7. See infra note 308 and accompanying text. 
 8. See infra Part II. 
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corporate law as a form of covert protectionism. Corporate law rules can be 
protectionist in effect without being discriminatory on their face. Overt legal 
discrimination against out-of-state interests can be unlawful from a domestic or 
supranational perspective or uncomfortable from an international relations 
perspective. Countries typically want to insulate national champions from foreign 
takeover threats, but also encourage their own business corporations to pursue targets 
abroad. Corporate law thus serves as an effective, but less obvious, form of 
protectionist intervention. Rules of corporate law and ownership structures serve 
multiple purposes and are often nondiscriminatory on their face but can work as a 
potent tool to shield local firms against foreign threats.  
This Article does not seek to resolve the ongoing debate about the merits of 
nationalist policies, which may well be deleterious in some contexts and welfare 
enhancing in others. Instead, it seeks to underscore the grip of nationalism on 
corporate law and its significant implications for existing theories on the 
determinants of corporate governance. It draws attention to a critical factor missing 
from conventional accounts of the evolution of corporate law, raises the possibility 
of backlash in the future of corporate governance, and complicates the normative 
analysis of corporate institutions by pointing to a broader set of economic and 
geopolitical considerations. 
The dominant debate about the determinants of corporate governance gravitates 
towards two different high-level explanations. Efficiency accounts posit that 
corporate law outcomes reflect basic economic exigencies, notably the reduction of 
agency costs among managers, shareholders, and creditors that plague the corporate 
form.9 Under this view, legal systems around the world tend to converge towards the 
optimal regime that best mitigates agency costs and increases firm value.10 Political 
accounts emphasize the role of interest groups in shaping corporate governance.11 
This line of work typically stresses the role of history, ideology, and path dependence 
in forging the content of legal and economic institutions. These studies focus 
primarily on the special interests and power of managers, shareholders, and workers 
as the relevant constituencies. 
The grip of nationalism on corporate law shows that these conventional accounts 
are unduly narrow. By focusing exclusively on agency costs, efficiency accounts 
have neglected the other possible ways in which corporate law can affect social 
welfare, such as by influencing economic integration, national security, and local 
development. At the same time, existing political accounts have overlooked the 
popular appeal of nationalist corporate policies and the interests of broader segments 
of the population on corporate governance outcomes. The grip of nationalism thus 
underlines how corporate governance arrangements matter in ways that transcend the 
 
 
 9. For an exposition of this perspective, see, e.g., John Armour, Henry Hansmann, 
Reinier Kraakman & Mariana Pargendler, What Is Corporate Law?, in THE ANATOMY OF 
CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 1 (2017). 
 10. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 2, at 440. 
 11. For prominent political accounts, see, e.g., PETER ALEXIS GOUREVITCH & JAMES J. 
SHINN, POLITICAL POWER AND CORPORATE CONTROL: THE NEW GLOBAL POLITICS OF 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (2005); MARK J. ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS (1994); 
Marco Pagano & Paolo F. Volpin, The Political Economy of Corporate Governance, 85 AM. 
ECON. REV. 1005 (2005).  
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concerns about firm-level efficiency and firm-level politics that have dominated the 
field.  
The strength of nationalist forces also suggests that the usual forecasts about the 
effects of globalization on corporate law may be flawed. The existing predictions 
have alternated exclusively between the prospect of convergence towards more 
efficient corporate laws that better protect outside investors12 or the possibility of 
persistence of traditional differences in corporate governance despite the powerful 
thrust of globalization.13 Yet, the combination of rising foreign ownership with the 
political deficit of foreigners can lead to a different, but unforeseen, scenario: neither 
convergence nor persistence, as conventionally assumed,14 but backlash. Once 
foreign investors come to dominate local capital markets, as is increasingly the 
case,15 there may be greater political pressure towards investor-unfriendly corporate 
reforms—a trend that I suggest may well be under way.  
The remainder of this Article proceeds as follows. Part I provides a brief overview 
of the relationship between corporate law and nationalism and demonstrates their 
interaction in the historical experiences of several key jurisdictions. These vignettes 
are merely illustrative, but they indicate how deep the link between nationalism and 
corporate law can be. Part II summarizes the evidence on the economic effects of 
foreign corporate control, showing that it is ultimately inconclusive. Part III explains 
why corporate law can be an attractive instrument to accomplish nationalist 
objectives and explores the possible regulatory responses to this phenomenon. Part 
IV analyzes the implications of these findings for future developments in corporate 
lawmaking. Part V concludes by reflecting on the prospect of the bond between 
nationalism and corporate law.  
I. NATIONALISM AND CORPORATE LAW: THE HISTORICAL AND COMPARATIVE 
EXPERIENCE  
The relationship between nationalism and corporate law is complex and 
multidirectional. Autarky and globalization can have an indirect effect on corporate 
laws and governance arrangements—with autarky discouraging, and globalization 
promoting, investor protection and financial development.16 Yet corporate 
governance change is not only a byproduct of free trade or protectionist policies. 
Corporate law itself can operate as a conduit for nationalism or economic integration 
by promoting or thwarting cross-border investment. Whereas the indirect effects of 
 
 
 12. See, e.g., Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 2; Merrit Fox, The Rise of Foreign 
Ownership and Corporate Governance, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE LAW AND 
GOVERNANCE 35 (Jeffrey N. Gordon & Wolf-Georg Ringe eds., 2017). 
 13. See, e.g., Bebchuk & Roe, supra note 3, at 137.  
 14. For an influential collection of essays framed in these terms, see CONVERGENCE AND 
PERSISTENCE IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (Jeffrey N. Gordon & Mark J. Roe eds., 2004); see 
also Jeffrey N. Gordon, Convergence and Persistence in Corporate Law and Governance, in 
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE LAW AND GOVERNANCE (Jeffrey N. Gordon & Wolf-
Georg Ringe eds., 2017) (arguing that there has been “divergence in convergence” in the last 
fifteen years).  
 15. See infra Table 1. 
 16. See supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
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economic openness (or lack thereof) on corporate law are well known, the role of 
corporate law in shaping economic integration remains understudied.17  
In fact, the impact of nationalist concerns on corporate law reform is surprising 
given how messy the relationship between corporations and nation-states can be.18 
Corporations are legal entities, created by a state, that can have relationships with 
individuals, firms, and other states. The largest business corporations are usually 
multinationals, operating across jurisdictional boundaries. What, then, is the 
adequate hook for the attribution of nationality and the application of the state’s laws, 
sovereign powers, and protection? 
This question allows for different doctrinal answers. Some jurisdictions, notably 
the United Kingdom and the United States, have embraced the state of incorporation 
as the primary determinant of corporate nationality. Countries in Continental Europe, 
by contrast, had historically opted for the principal place of business (siège réel or 
“real seat”) as the relevant criterion.19 Nevertheless, jurisdictions from both camps 
have sporadically abandoned such doctrinal purities (themselves shaped by 
nationalist considerations, or lack thereof20) to inquire into the nationality of control, 
especially with respect to strategic sectors and in times of war.21 
The legal concept of corporate control first emerged to protect national security, 
not to mitigate agency costs.22 However, as corporate lawyers well know, it is 
difficult to create a universal test to identify corporate control in all instances. 
Unsurprisingly, relevant statutes and judicial decisions have used different threshold 
requirements for national shareholdings and board membership, depending on the 
historical context and industry in question. The central idea motivating the inquiry 
into corporate control is that the nationality of the individuals who control the firm 
determines their loyalty to the nation.  
Nationalist influence on corporate governance can take different forms. First and 
most importantly, control nationalism seeks to preserve domestic control of major 
business corporations. At a basic level, domestic control can be a symbol of national 
power and pride that epitomizes nationalism irrespective of its effects on the 
economic well-being of citizens. Citizens may prefer domestic control for the same 
reason that they cheer for their national sports team.  
 
 
 17. For a notable exception, see Jeffrey N. Gordon, The International Relations Wedge in 
the Corporate Convergence Debate, in CONVERGENCE AND PERSISTENCE IN CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE, supra note 14 (arguing that economic integration is best served by the diffusion 
of Anglo-Saxon model of widely held firms whose control is contestable). 
 18. See, e.g., Mihir A. Desai, The Decentering of the Global Firm, 32 WORLD ECON. 
1271, 1272 (2009) (“The defining characteristics of what made a firm belong to a country – 
where it was incorporated, where it was listed, the nationality of its investor base, the location 
of its headquarters functions – are no longer unified nor are they bound to one country.”). 
 19. Since 1999, the European Court of Justice has ruled that the real seat doctrine is 
incompatible with the freedom of establishment guaranteed by the European Union, favoring 
the place of incorporation as the relevant choice of law rule. But see infra notes 137–138 and 
accompanying text. 
 20. See infra notes 35–36, 220–221 and accompanying text. 
 21. See, e.g., Detlev F. Vagts, The Corporate Alien: Definitional Questions in Federal 
Restraints on Foreign Enterprise, 74 HARV. L. REV. 1489, 1505 (1961). 
 22. FÁBIO KONDER COMPARATO & CALIXTO SALOMÃO FILHO, O PODER DE CONTROLE NA 
SOCIEDADE ANÔNIMA 515 (4th ed., 2005). 
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Domestic control can also relate to nationalism in instrumental terms—that is, as 
a tool to increase the welfare of its nationals. Local managers and controlling 
shareholders benefit from their control powers and stand to gain by avoiding 
unwanted foreign takeovers.23 However, the interests of controllers alone does not 
explain the popular appeal of nationalism in corporate governance. Why would it 
matter to the general population that a given firm is in the hands of local rather than 
foreign elites?  
Another more controversial assumption is that domestic control has positive 
effects over national welfare more generally because of a greater commitment to the 
local economy in the form of jobs, investment, charitable contributions, and 
geopolitical allegiance. As discussed in Part II infra, the theoretical arguments and 
empirical evidence on this question are inconclusive. For now, it is enough to say 
that the popular appeal of nationalism, the interests of controlling shareholders, 
managers, and workers, and the presumed benefits to the nation at large constitute a 
powerful political alliance favoring domestic control of business corporations.  
Corporate law can assist in the retention of domestic control in various ways. 
Structural defenses relying on ownership structures—in the form of multivoting 
stock, nonvoting stock, voting caps, cross-shareholdings, and shareholder 
agreements—help prevent a hostile bid ex ante. Takeover defenses such as poison 
pills thwart hostile acquisitions of firms with dispersed ownership. Countries have 
also occasionally imposed nationality requirements for corporate directors and 
managers.  
Control nationalism can also lead to state ownership. The primary motivation 
behind state ownership in many jurisdictions is to maintain corporate control and 
headquarters on national soil.24 Several of the national oil companies (NOCs)—
which represent the lion’s share of global oil reserves—emerged through the 
expropriation of foreign investors, a product of nationalist sentiment and the political 
deficit of foreigners.25 To this day, governments continue to acquire equity stakes in 
major firms primarily as a shield against foreign intrusion.26 Ownership structures, 
in turn, are a crucial determinant of corporate laws, given their implications for the 
efficiency of different legal rules and their influence on the political economy of 
corporate reforms.27  
 
 
 23. Conversely, insulation from hostile takeovers can increase agency costs and hurt 
domestic public shareholders. 
 24. See, e.g., infra Sections I.A., I.C., I.G.  
 25. Paasha Mahdavi, Why Do Leaders Nationalize the Oil Industry? The Politics of 
Resource Expropriation, 75 ENERGY POL’Y 228, 236–39 (2014) (reporting that NOCs, which 
emerged through waves of nationalizations, control between seventy-three and ninety-five 
percent of the world’s oil reserves).  
 26. See, e.g., Helene Fouquet & Mark Deen, Macron Nationalizes Shipyard, Spooking 
Outsiders, BLOOMBERG POLITICS (July 27, 2017, 1:23 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news 
/articles/2017-07-27/macron-nationalizes-shipyard-in-domestic-step-spooking-outsiders 
[https://perma.cc/RVS6-RJ27] (discussing France’s recent nationalization of a shipyard in 
response to a bid by an Italian company). 
 27. See Armour et al., supra note 9; Bebchuk & Roe, supra note 3; Mariana Pargendler, 
State Ownership and Corporate Governance, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 2917 (2012) (describing 
how the state’s interests as a shareholder shape corporate laws). Jeffrey Gordon has suggested 
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Nationalist forces can also shape corporate law in ways that go beyond the 
protection of domestic control. Legal nationalism seeks to preserve the application 
of domestic corporate law to firms operating in a given state. Although there may be 
other benign justifications for this approach (such as the prevention of a “race to the 
bottom” in the control of externalities), this serves the different protectionist goals of 
(i) raising the costs of entry for foreign firms, (ii) creating captive demand for the 
services of local lawyers and other providers, and (iii) avoiding evasion of corporate 
laws that are nationalist in substance. The application of the real seat doctrine can 
therefore be understood as a form of legal nationalism. However, combating legal 
nationalism through the availability of choice of incorporation state and governing 
law does not eliminate the influence of control nationalism, since companies often 
choose to incorporate in their home states, where they have political power and can 
exercise it in a protectionist manner.28  
Finally, nationalism can have indirect and serendipitous effects on corporate law 
and governance. Nationalist regulations in India during the 1960s required foreign 
companies to divest their stockholdings below forty percent.29 This had the indirect 
effect of promoting the development of Indian capital markets by encouraging 
multinationals to sell their excess stakes through public offerings.30 More broadly, 
foreign ownership restrictions and governmental controls on foreign investment can 
greatly decrease the contestability of control in certain countries and industries, 
thereby compromising the role of takeovers in reducing agency costs and promoting 
efficient management practices. 
The narratives that follow illustrate the grip of nationalism on corporate law and 
governance across time and place. They cover several prominent jurisdictions over 
an extended period to show that this phenomenon is longstanding and pervasive. 
These synopses are not comprehensive. The countries covered have many more 
instances of nationalist corporate law policies than are discussed below. The 
selection of jurisdictions is also merely illustrative. While the focus is on 
jurisdictions that have attracted significant attention in the comparative corporate 
governance literature, numerous other countries have followed similar patterns.31 
 
 
that ownership structures matter for transnational economic integration, with controlled 
companies being more susceptible to protectionist behavior than widely held firms subject to 
hostile takeovers. Companies with entrenched controlling shareholders may continue to 
pursue inefficient home-country (nationalist) bias in operational decisions, such as the location 
of factories or R&D activity. By contrast, the market for corporate control can deter 
nationalist-inspired inefficiencies in the management of firms with dispersed ownership, since 
depressed share prices will attract hostile, and possibly foreign, bidders. Gordon, supra note 
17, at 161. 
 28. See infra notes 265, 288 and accompanying text. Moreover, the very equilibrium 
resulting from regulatory competition may be influenced by the nationalist or protectionist 
tendencies of home states. See infra note 290 and accompanying text. 
 29. Tarun Khanna & Krishna G. Palepu, The Evolution of Concentrated Ownership in 
India, in A HISTORY OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AROUND THE WORLD 302 (Randall K. Morck 
ed., 2007) 
 30. Id.  
 31. See, e.g., Randall Morck, Gloria Tian & Bernard Yeung, Who Owns Whom? 
Economic Nationalism and Family Controlled Pyramidal Groups in Canada, in 
GOVERNANCE, MULTINATIONALS AND GROWTH 45–47 (Lorraine Eden & Wendy Dobson eds., 
2020] THE GRIP OF NATIONALISM  541 
 
To underscore the relevance of nationalism in corporate lawmaking is 
emphatically not to suggest that it is the only, or even the most important, driving 
force behind governance structures. Corporate governance arrangements are 
complex phenomena shaped by a multitude of factors. The goal, instead, is to 
highlight nationalism as a critical element that has been ignored, downplayed, or 
dismissed as an aberration.  
A. France  
To examine the effect of economic nationalism on the development of corporate 
laws, let’s begin with the case of France, a jurisdiction where nationalist sentiment 
is particularly strong. The archetypical features of the French system of corporate 
governance—state ownership and tenured voting rights—are largely attributable to 
nationalist objectives. The type of overtly protectionist corporate law reforms that 
have made headlines in the last decades have a long historical pedigree in the country.  
Even before the advent of general corporate laws, concerns about foreign control 
shaped the internal governance rules of major corporations. To avoid external 
influence, the statutory charter of the Bank of France of 1808 prevented foreigners 
from attending shareholder meetings and from serving in managerial positions.32 All 
equity interests in the bank took the form of registered shares so that the company 
could know the nationality of shareholders.33 Other large corporations adopted 
similar arrangements.34 
Nationalist impulses also influenced the application of the domestic legal regime 
to local firms. Early French firms sought to circumvent the limitations of the national 
regime by incorporating in England, which was arguably “the Delaware of the second 
half of the nineteenth century.”35 Even the Moulin Rouge at some point sought an 
English charter.36 This effort, however, was frustrated by the emerging doctrine of 
the “real seat” to determine the nationality of corporations, which denied recognition 
to France-based companies incorporated abroad. Moreover, the attribution of French 
nationality in certain industries required effective control by French citizens in 
addition to headquarters in France.37 
Similarly to other jurisdictions, the regime of shareholder voting rights has also 
responded to the fear of foreign control. Multivoting stock became popular for the 
first time in France in the early 1920s, a time in which the devaluation of the franc 
turned French corporations into vulnerable targets of foreign takeovers.38 The French 
 
 
2005) (exploring the reasons behind the connection between the rise of nationalism and the 
retreat of widely held firms in Canada); Li-Wen Li & Curtis J. Milhaupt, We Are the (National) 
Champions: Understanding the Mechanisms of State Capitalism in China, 65 STAN. L. REV. 
697, 746 (2013) (describing how the corporate governance structure of SOE groups in China 
serves to maximize country-level, rather than firm-level, objectives).  
 32. MARCEL-EDOUARD CUQ, LA NATIONALITÉ DES SOCIÉTÉS 79 (1921). 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Elvin R. Latty, Pseudo-Foreign Corporations, 65 YALE L.J. 137, 166 (1955).  
 36. Id. 
 37. CUQ, supra note 32, at 80–81. 
 38. HENRI MAZEAUD, LE VOTE PRIVILÉGIÉ DANS LES SOCIÉTÉS DE CAPITAUX 10 (2nd ed., 
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government led the way by issuing super voting shares to itself in the Société 
française de Navigation rhénane and the Compagnie des chemins de fer du Maroc in 
the 1920s.39 The state also encouraged the adoption of multivoting stock by private 
firms as “dictated by the national interest.”40 Scholars at the time specifically justified 
the use of multivoting stock as a means to ensure French control over companies that 
were “particularly useful for the development of our country.”41  
The unregulated issuance of multivoting stock, highly controversial from the 
outset, would not be long lasting. In lieu of permitting conventional multivoting 
stock, France instituted its signature regime of “tenured voting”: by charter 
provision, companies could grant double voting rights to registered shareholders who 
had held their shares for a certain number of years (typically two years).42 While the 
merits of tenured voting rights from an agency cost perspective are debatable,43 this 
mechanism has the clear effect of strengthening the voting power of the state, which 
is typically a long-term holder. The ample use of double voting rights, combined with 
the widespread presence of ownership ceilings, have helped protect France from 
foreign takeovers in the face of rising levels of foreign ownership in its stock 
markets.44  
Despite European Union (E.U.) pressure for liberalization over the last few 
decades, France has instead promoted several protectionist reforms. The most 
important corporate law reforms in France in recent years were promulgated as a 
direct response to high-profile takeover threats from foreign bidders. The mere rumor 
that PepsiCo would launch a bid for Danone, a cherished conglomerate best known 
for yogurt products, prompted a renewed defense of “economic patriotism” in France 
in 2005.45 The incident triggered not only the enactment of regulatory protections to 
“strategic sectors”46 but also changes in corporate law rules. In the same year, the 
French securities regulator issued the so-called Danone Amendment to France’s 
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Takeover Code, requiring rumored bidders to state their intentions early in the 
process and either “put up or shut up” (i.e., either make an offer promptly or refrain 
from doing so for a period of six months).47  
The traumatic hostile takeover of French steel champion Arcelor by the Indian 
group Mittal in 2006—which succeeded despite strong political opposition—was 
particularly consequential from a legal standpoint. In the same year, France 
introduced its first type of shareholder rights plan to deter takeovers, which was 
nicknamed “bons Breton” (for the finance minister who sponsored it) or, more 
revealingly, “bons patriotes.”48 In 2014, the French parliament promulgated the 
openly protectionist loi Florange (to “reconquer the real economy”), in a reference 
to the controversial closure by Arcelor Mittal of an industrial plant in the city of 
Florange in 2012.49  
In addition to requiring companies to make every effort to find a buyer before 
closing a plant, the loi Florange made several encroachments into corporate law. The 
loi Florange abandoned France’s no-frustration rule and permitted prebid approval 
of shareholder rights plans, hence enabling shareholders to commit to incumbent 
management.50 The new statute also strengthened the information and consultation 
rights of employees in ways that could slow down the process and even deter 
takeover bids.51  
Finally, the statute reversed the existing default rule by imposing the automatic 
grant of double voting rights to shares held for at least two years, unless shareholders 
opted out by a two-thirds majority vote. This change explicitly aimed to preserve or 
enhance the influence of the French state in companies of strategic importance while 
permitting it to divest some of its stockholdings to pay off mounting national debt.52 
While most firms reverted to the old default rule of proportional voting following the 
reform, companies with significant state shareholdings—mostly national 
champions—some saw the adoption of double voting rights, as the state often 
acquired shares in the market to block a reversal.53 The French government expressly 
argued that its exercise of voting rights would allow it to “strengthen the coherence 
between the state’s strategy for the country and that put into effect by each company 
with state shareholdings.”54  
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State ownership has periodically emerged with the immediate goal of keeping 
national champions under French control.55 The control battle over power company 
Suez is illustrative. In order to fend off a bid by Italian competitor Enel, the French 
government promoted a merger between Suez and state-controlled GDF. The 
transaction faced significant opposition from the left: it led to GDF’s privatization in 
contradiction to prior promises made to trade unions, though the state retained a 
thirty-five percent interest in the combined firm.56 The episode shows that the general 
popular impetus to uphold domestic control is often stronger than ideological and 
special interest preferences for state ownership.  
More recently, the French government proposed a series of reforms to the Civil 
Code with the goal of mitigating the perceived financialization and short-term 
orientation of French corporate governance, allegedly inspired by Anglo-Saxon 
practices.57 The proposed legislation seeks to overcome the focus on shareholder 
value by specifying that “the company shall be managed in its own interest, 
considering the social and environmental consequences of its activity” and increasing 
the participation of workers on company boards.58 In contrast to the prevailing 
predictions in the literature, this proposed shift away from shareholder value 
appeared in the context of strong foreign participation in French capital markets,59 
with the official report specifically referring to the presence of “Anglo-Saxon funds” 
in its introduction.60 
B. Germany 
Corporate laws and practices in Germany have also been particularly responsive 
to nationalist sentiment. As in France, the expansion of multivoting stock after World 
War I took place in connection with the fear of foreign takeovers due to the 
depreciation of the German mark.61 Apprehension about potential foreign influence 
swayed public opinion and German courts, which generally declined to interfere even 
as firms began issuing high-vote preference shares at extraordinary multiples.62 
Although the protection of German ownership was the main justification for the 
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practice, multivoting stock also gained ground in firms that did not face plausible 
foreign threats.63  
Subsequent laws during the Nazi regime, as well as the Corporations Law of 1965, 
restricted the use of multivoting stock as takeover threats subsided, though certain 
exceptions remained.64 In the 1970s, when German companies once again became 
vulnerable to foreign takeovers fueled by oil dollars from the Middle East, 
multivoting shares and voting caps experienced a renaissance as defensive devices.65 
It was not until the liberalizing Law on Transparency and Control in Corporations 
(Gesetz zur Kontrolle und Transparenz im Unternehmensbereich – KonTraG) of 
1998 that German law prohibited voting caps and multivoting stock.66  
While the abolition of control-enhancing devices faced considerable resistance in 
other European countries, it surprisingly enjoyed the support of the German 
establishment.67 Yet the enthusiasm for greater market discipline would not be long 
lasting once the new vulnerability of German firms to foreign bidders became 
apparent. The groundbreaking takeover of traditional German telecom Mannesmann 
by British firm Vodafone in 1999—in what was the first successful hostile tender 
offer by a foreign bidder in the country’s history—strengthened nationalist 
sensitivities.68 Having made its local firms vulnerable after dismantling structural 
protections through corporate reforms, Germany then became a formidable opponent 
to the board neutrality provision in the Takeover Directive, which was ultimately 
rendered optional.69 Germany’s Takeover Act of 2002 professed to support board 
neutrality, but in reality permits the employment of defensive measures approved by 
the supervisory board.70 
Finally, Germany’s signature regime of worker representation on corporate 
boards also has a distinctive nationalist flavor. In the German system of “quasi-parity 
codetermination,” employee directors comprise half the members of the supervisory 
boards of companies with more than 2,000 Germany-based employees.71 Not only 
are workers generally inclined to oppose foreign takeovers but German law also 
specifically restricts the right to appoint labor directors to Germany-based employees 
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and trade unions.72 This differential treatment of foreign employees has recently 
withstood a challenge before the European Court of Justice (ECJ).73  
C. Scandinavia and Switzerland 
Nationalist and protectionist pressures have also profoundly influenced other 
European countries. Take the case of Sweden, a country that has strongly (and 
successfully) opposed both the move to a “one-share-one-vote” standard at the E.U. 
level and the introduction of a mandatory “breakthrough rule” in the Takeover 
Directive.74 Scholars have long debated the motivation for high levels of ownership 
concentration in Sweden, a jurisdiction where controlling shareholders coexist with 
a legal regime that reasonably protects outside investors. Ronald Gilson attributes 
the dominance of controlling shareholders in Sweden to the nonpecuniary private 
benefits of control, such as social status, enjoyed by the dominant families in a small 
jurisdiction.75 Mark Roe argues that social democracies go hand-in-hand with 
ownership concentration, so that large shareholders can counterbalance labor 
pressures.76  
Peter Högfeldt’s case study on the evolution of corporate governance in Sweden, 
however, highlights the nationalist dimension of the symbiotic relationship between 
social democracy and concentrated ownership. “The Social Democrats,” he explains, 
“only get the necessary resources and indirect support for their social and economic 
policies from the private sector if the largest firms remain under Swedish control so 
that capital does not migrate.”77 At the same time, Sweden’s wealthy families have 
regarded support for social democratic policies as a small price to pay for their 
continued grip on corporate control.78  
Significant restrictions on foreign ownership have historically been an integral 
part of the Swedish model, with profound implications for governance structures.79 
Foreign ownership of Swedish corporations was limited to special “unrestricted 
shares” having at most twenty percent of voting rights, while “restricted shares” 
could only be held by Swedish individuals and institutions.80 To reconcile this 
limitation with the need to raise substantial amounts of foreign capital, some Swedish 
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firms like Ericsson and SKF resorted to an extreme separation of voting and cash 
flow rights in the form of B-shares carrying a 1/1000 voting right.81 A legal reform 
in 1944 established a maximum multiple of ten votes per share but grandfathered 
existing firms, to the effect that Ericsson continued issuing shares with 1/1000 of a 
voting right into the twenty-first century.82  
Foreign ownership of listed companies increased dramatically as foreign 
restrictions were lifted in 1993 in view of E.U. membership, but other governance 
substitutes emerged in the form of greater reliance on multivoting shares to ensure 
continued Swedish control.83 Foreign investors have repeatedly decried this system 
as “an example of Swedish ultranationalism.” However, the government’s policy on 
this issue remains unchanged.84 
Nationalist policies have also played a major part in the corporate governance 
landscape in Norway and Switzerland, which are not formal members of the E.U. 
Norway limited foreign ownership in public companies to thirty-three percent of the 
voting shares until the free trade accord of the European Economic Area (EEA) 
imposed equal treatment to foreign investments in 1995.85 Seeking to attract foreign 
capital while abandoning the foreign ownership restrictions, Norwegian companies 
began issuing a significant number of nonvoting shares to the public.86  
Norway also stands out for its embrace of state ownership, with levels that are the 
highest among developed countries and comparable to those of emerging markets.87 
Held as a model in state-owned enterprise (SOE) governance, Norway’s commitment 
to state shareholdings is in large part driven by the desire to retain local control over 
important industries. Six of the eight Norwegian SOEs listed on the Oslo Stock 
Exchange have as their declared purpose, beyond a return on investment, the 
retention of head office functions in Norway.88  
In contrast to Norway and Sweden, Switzerland has traditionally eschewed 
foreign ownership restrictions and other forms of regulatory discrimination against 
foreign investors.89 Switzerland instead provides a paradigmatic example of the use 
of corporate law as stealth protectionism, showing how nationalist constraints 
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embedded in corporate law can assist a country in attaining a “cosmopolitan image” 
that is nevertheless “deceptive.”90  Corporate law mechanisms helped maintain the 
“striking incongruity” between major protectionist barriers against foreign takeovers 
with the aggressive pursuit of foreign targets by Swiss companies.91  
For a long time, a panoply of corporate law mechanisms rendered Swiss 
companies effectively takeover proof against foreign bidders.92 Until the 1990s, most 
Swiss corporations had charter provisions prohibiting ownership of registered shares 
(as opposed to bearer shares) by foreign investors, while bearer shares lacked the 
right to vote.93 When companies began abolishing these voluntary foreign ownership 
restrictions in the 1980s to attract international capital, they then started imposing 
strict ownership caps as a takeover defense.94 Until 2008, corporate law required a 
majority of board members to be Swiss nationals and reside in Switzerland.95 
Historically, the most formidable and distinctive takeover defense under Swiss 
law has been the Vinkulierung, which is the charter provision granting the board of 
directors full discretion to deny registration (and therefore the exercise of shareholder 
rights) to transferred shares for any reason.96 Used at least since the 1920s to “curb a 
perceived excessive foreign influence on Swiss companies,”97 the Vinkulierung 
gained ground during World War II as a mechanism to avoid Nazi control of 
corporations and placement on an “enemy list.”98 Scholars generally acknowledge 
that the primary purpose of the Vinkulierung was to “limit the influence of foreign 
investors on Swiss companies.”99 
Nestlé led the way in eliminating its own charter restrictions on foreign ownership 
in 1988, but only after its takeover of U.K. firm Rowntree generated significant 
controversy and fear of retaliation in view of its own defenses against foreign 
acquirers.100 Although a 1991 reform restricted the scope of Vinkulierung,101 the 
mechanism is still permissible by law and occasionally present in corporate practice 
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up to this day.102 While Swiss corporations are currently far more vulnerable to 
hostile acquisitions than in the past, foreign takeover threats continue to prompt 
protectionist legal reforms.103 
D. United Kingdom 
The United Kingdom stands out for its particularly vibrant market of corporate 
control and liberal takeover laws, which have long embraced the principle of board 
neutrality in the face of a hostile bid.104 Various factors may help account for the 
United Kingdom’s greater openness to foreign capital. England industrialized before 
other countries and therefore was first able to abandon protectionist practices to 
promote an infant domestic industry.105 It also came to boast an especially developed 
financial sector which stood to gain from cross-border acquisitions and strong 
institutional investors who favored an active takeover market. Its liberal market 
economy was not as easily disrupted by hostile takeovers as the coordinated market 
economies of continental Europe.106 Moreover, having a unitary political system, it 
was immune from the type of state-level protectionism that tarnished the 
development of U.S. takeover laws.107  
Nationalism, however, still left its mark on U.K. company law and governance. 
With the eruption of World War I, new restrictions to trading with the enemy put 
pressure on two core tenets of U.K. corporate law: the strict separation between the 
company as an entity and its shareholders and the place of incorporation as the 
determinant of a company’s domicile and applicable law. In its famous 1916 decision 
in Daimler Co. v. Continental Tyre & Rubber Co., the House of Lords was willing 
to upset both canons by holding that a company chartered in England nonetheless 
qualified as an enemy because its directors and shareholders were German and 
resided in Germany.108 The decision, which served national security rather than 
agency cost concerns, appears to provide the first judicial articulation of the concept 
of corporate control.109  
Takeovers of major companies have also occasionally raised eyebrows. The 
acquisitions of Ford U.K. by Ford U.S.A. and of Rootes by Chrysler, triggered 
government scrutiny in the 1960s. The deals only went ahead once the new owners 
committed to maintain the companies’ “Britishness,” through mechanisms such as a 
minimum number of U.K. directors and an increase in export targets to assist the 
 
 
 102. See Kunz, supra note 95, at 909.  
 103. Id. at 874 n.37 (noting how hostile takeover attempts by foreign firms led to swift 
changes to securities laws in the 2000s).   
 104. See John Armour & David A. Skeel, Jr., Who Writes the Rules for Hostile Takeovers, 
and Why?—The Peculiar Divergence of U.S. and U.K. Takeover Regulation, 95 GEO. L.J. 
1727, 1775 (2007); see also Davies et al., supra note 48, at 221. 
 105. Ha-Joon Chang, Kicking Away the Ladder: The “Real” History of Free Trade, 
FOREIGN POLICY IN FOCUS (Dec. 30, 2003), https://fpif.org/kicking_away_the_ladder_the_real 
_history_of_free_trade/ [https://perma.cc/JYC2-7KG2]. 
 106. For an elaboration of this argument, see infra note 310 and accompanying text.  
 107. See infra Section II.H. 
 108. [1916] 2 AC 307 (Lord Parker of Waddington). 
 109. COMPARATO & SALOMÃO FILHO, supra note 22, at 515. 
550 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL  [Vol. 95:533 
 
national balance of payments.110 In response to these foreign takeovers, the 
government promoted a merger between BMC and Leyland to create a larger and 
more competitive car company that was entirely British.111 In 1981, when the 
Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation (HSBC) attempted to acquire the 
Royal Bank of Scotland, the Bank of England opposed the transaction by arguing 
that RBS should remain “British.”112 The Monopolies and Mergers Commission 
ultimately vetoed the transaction as contrary to the public interest for quintessentially 
nationalist reasons.113 Although it ultimately proceeded without regulatory objection, 
the takeover of chocolate maker Rowntree by Nestlé in 1986 generated heated 
parliamentary debate on the harm to Britain’s national interest and the lack of 
reciprocity given the Swiss company’s insulation from foreign acquisitions.114  
The U.K.’s historical approach to foreign takeovers has been far from hands off, 
though still quite receptive compared to other jurisdictions. However, this welcoming 
attitude has been changing fast. The hostile takeover of Cadbury by Kraft, a U.S. 
food giant, was particularly consequential in reviving anxiety about foreign 
acquisitions and prompting the United Kingdom to revisit its liberal takeover laws.  
Cadbury was an iconic U.K. firm,115 though by the time of the takeover only a 
fraction of its workforce was located in Britain.116 Not only did Cadbury fall into 
foreign hands, but Kraft also added insult to injury by reneging on a promise to keep 
open a Somerdale factory within days of completing the acquisition.117 This reversal 
of position leading to the relocation of the factory to Poland generated significant 
public and parliamentary uproar and resulted in a formal statement of public criticism 
by the Takeover Panel.118 The incident also triggered two inquiries by the House of 
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Commons in which Kraft agreed to several undertakings, ranging from the 
preservation of jobs and work conditions in the United Kingdom to the continued 
sponsorship of the London Olympics.119 The House of Commons subsequently 
published a report entitled Is Kraft Working for Cadbury? to assess whether the U.S. 
firm was meeting its undertakings—a clear instance of bullying against a foreign 
buyer.120  
The political reaction against foreign takeovers was sufficiently strong to induce 
the Takeover Panel—which is run by investment bankers in the city and oriented 
towards the interests of shareholders—to enact rules that for the first time considered 
the interests of employees. It included provisions that strengthened the “put up or 
shut up” rule, banned deal protections such as break-up fees, and imposed enhanced 
disclosure requirements to help dissuade takeover activity.121 Significantly, the 
Takeover Code now compels bidders to disclose their intention with respect to 
employment, conditions of employment, and the company’s place of business and 
headquarters; requires target boards to give their views with respect to the effects of 
the bid on these matters; and enables employee representatives and pension scheme 
trustees to issue a separate opinion on the effects of the bid on employment and 
pension schemes.122  
The hostile takeover bid launched by Pfizer, a U.S. firm, against U.K. 
pharmaceutical giant AstraZeneca in 2014 again produced strong political resistance 
and provoked further changes to the Takeover Code. The House of Commons asked 
Pfizer’s CEO for assurances about the preservation of jobs and research and 
development investments in the U.K. during the course of the offer, but there was 
uncertainty about whether such commitments would be legally binding.123 In 
response, the Takeover Panel again amended its rules to permit bidders to make 
enforceable “post-offer undertakings” about their course of action following the 
acquisition, in addition to nonbinding “statements of intentions,” to assuage 
politicians and the public about the consequences of foreign acquisitions.124 In 2016, 
Japanese firm SoftBank made use of a postoffer undertaking for the first time in its 
U.S. $32 billion buyout of U.K. chip designer ARM Holdings, promising to double 
 
 
(May 26, 2010), http://www.thetakeoverpanel.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2009/12/2010 
-14.pdf [https://perma.cc/4WYR-TZ5Y] (finding that Kraft did not meet the required standard 
of care in the formulation of its original statement). 
 119. BUSINESS, INNOVATION AND SKILLS COMMITTEE, IS KRAFT WORKING FOR CADBURY?, 
2010–12, HC 871, at 3, 6 (UK). 
 120. Id. 
 121. David Kershaw, Corporate Law and Self-Regulation, in OXFORD HANDBOOK ON 
CORPORATE LAW AND GOVERNANCE 880 (Jeffrey N. Gordon & Wolf-Georg Ringe eds., 2015). 
 122. The City Code on Takeovers and Mergers (2016), Rules 2.7, 2.11, 24.2 and 25.2.  
 123. Graeme Wearden, Pfizer-AstraZeneca: MPs Question Pharma Chiefs on Takeover, 
GUARDIAN (May 13, 2014, 11:36 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/business/blog/2014 
/may/13/pfizer-astrazeneca-mps-grill-pharma-chiefs-over-takeover-live 
[https://perma.cc/A7FT-X3ZZ]. 
 124. Gillian Fairfield, Statements of Intention Under the UK Takeover Code – Say What 
You Mean and Do What You Say, HERBERT SMITH FREEHILLS (Nov. 28, 2014), 
https://www.herbertsmithfreehills.com/latest-thinking/statements-of-intention-under-the-uk-
takeover-code-–-say-what-you-mean-and-do-what [https://perma.cc/3TDF-KSZC]. 
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ARM’s employee headcount in the United Kingdom and to maintain its headquarters 
in Cambridge for five years.125  
A hostile bid by Kraft for Anglo-Dutch giant Unilever, which faced political 
resistance,126 sparked new calls for changes to the Takeover Code.127 Prime Minister 
May’s Conservative Manifesto of 2017 vowed to reform the rules on takeovers and 
mergers.128 Even The Economist, a pro-market publication, has reversed its views on 
foreign acquisitions. While recent editions had decried protectionist tendencies and 
touted the benefits of free takeover markets,129 a 2017 editorial showed a clear change 
of heart, expressly disputing the analogy between free trade and the market for 
corporate control because “having a critical mass of global firms matters.”130 It 
argued that “there is a finite stock of big global companies that is hard to replace,” 
so that “Britain probably could not create a new drugs giant if AstraZeneca were 
bought.”131 A subsequent amendment to the Takeover Code in 2018 further increased 
disclosure requirements concerning the bidder’s intentions with respect to the 
target’s research and development functions and the location of its headquarters.132  
The growing fear of foreign takeovers is leading the United Kingdom to 
reevaluate the core tenets of its takeover policy.133 This shows that friendly attitudes 
to foreign control are not durable but are instead inherently unstable and susceptible 
to political change.  
 
 
 125. Sean Farrell & Julia Kollewe, ARM Shareholders Approve SoftBank Takeover, 
GUARDIAN (Aug. 30, 2016, 12:56 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/business/2016/aug/30 
/arm-shareholders-softbank-takeover-tech-lord-myners [https://perma.cc/843T-VSUK]. 
 126. Arash Massoudi & James Fontanella-Khan, The $143bn Flop: How Warren Buffett 
and 3G Lost Unilever, FIN. TIMES (Feb. 21, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/d846766e-
f81b-11e6-bd4e-68d53499ed71 [https://perma.cc/8L3W-835F].  
 127. Scheherazade Daneshkhu, Jim Pickard & Arash Massoudi, Unilever Calls for Revamp 
of UK Takeover Code After Kraft Bid, FIN. TIMES (Mar. 14, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content 
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[https://perma.cc/2RGZ-W8WD].  
 130. Britain Has Second Thoughts About Foreign Takeovers: A Lack of Big Multinational 
Companies Does Not Bode Well for the Post-Brexit Economy, ECONOMIST (Mar. 2, 2017), 
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E. European Union  
The European Union has been deeply involved in the regulation of corporate law 
in the last several decades. While corporate lawmaking at the E.U. level aims to 
promote a variety of policy objectives, there is little question that the promotion of 
economic integration—and the related goal of removing barriers to cross-border 
consolidations—reigns supreme.134 The reduction in agency costs and the promotion 
of capital market efficiency has played at best a secondary role.  
The various E.U. initiatives on corporate law are noteworthy as the first and only 
multilateral effort to promote economic integration by curbing the use of corporate 
law for protectionist purposes. The European Union guarantees four freedoms: the 
free movement of goods, services, establishment, and capital. Policymakers soon 
recognized that corporate law could easily impinge on the latter two, to the effect 
that European company law came to be held as a “cornerstone of the internal 
market.”135 To further economic integration, E.U. corporate law aims to eliminate 
protectionist barriers to the market for corporate control, reduce the costs of 
compliance with different legal standards, and avoid a possible regulatory “race to 
the bottom.”136  
The European Union’s track record in lifting corporate law barriers to freedom of 
capital and freedom of establishment is mixed and underscores the political and 
conceptual challenges plaguing efforts to overcome the grip of nationalism on 
corporate law. While the European Court of Justice (ECJ) helped curb nationalist 
tendencies by outlawing the real seat doctrine and most uses of golden shares, the 
Takeover Directive’s legislative attempt to remove protectionist barriers to an 
internal market for corporate control is widely regarded as a failure. I will examine 
each in turn. 
A key development in E.U. corporate law since the turn of the twentieth century 
has been the rise of choice of law. Prior to the ECJ’s intervention, most member 
States embraced the real seat doctrine, which required corporations to be governed 
by the corporate laws of the jurisdiction of their principal place of business. The real 
seat doctrine thus foreclosed choice of law.137 
 
 
 134. See Martin Gelter, EU Company Law Harmonization Between Convergence and 
Varieties of Capitalism 33 (European Corp. Governance Inst., Working Paper No. 355/2017, 
2017) (“Throughout all periods [since the 1960s], EU company law harmonization was largely 
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 136. See Martin Gelter, Centros, the Freedom of Establishment for Companies and the 
Court’s Accidental Vision for Corporate Law, in EU LAW STORIES (Fernanda Nicola & Bill 
Davies eds., 2017).  
 137. More precisely, the real seat doctrine tied the choice of law to the choice of the 
principal place of business, making a change in the applicable law impossible in the absence 
of a relocation (and, therefore, making it inordinately expensive).   
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In Centros Ltd. v. Erhvervs-og Selskabsstyrelsen and its progeny,138 the ECJ held 
that the real seat doctrine was inconsistent with the E.U. principle of freedom of 
establishment, which permits companies to incorporate in any member State of their 
choosing. Actual competition among member States for corporate charters still 
appears to be rather limited, with no “European Delaware” emerging to date.139 
Nevertheless, the ECJ cases arguably induced member States to eliminate their 
minimum capital requirements for private companies—a long-established feature of 
Continental company law—in an attempt to halt the flight of start-ups to the United 
Kingdom, which lacked similar rules.140 
In addition to combating legal protectionism that prevented choice of law, E.U. 
law has also tried to curb control protectionism in the form of golden shares and 
takeover defenses. First created during the U.K. privatizations in the 1980s, golden 
shares essentially grant the government veto rights over fundamental corporate 
decisions (such as mergers, asset sales, and dissolutions) that are disproportionate to, 
or even independent of, its cash flow rights in the company. The rationale for the 
award of golden shares is presumably to protect the public interest at large, though 
the government’s intervention formally takes place through mechanisms of corporate 
law.141 In a series of pivotal decisions since 2002, the ECJ has systematically 
invalidated the use of golden shares by member States as a violation of free 
movement of capital.142 The ECJ golden shares jurisprudence is momentous both for 
outlawing an important mechanism for the protection of national industry and for its 
potentially broad implications for E.U. scrutiny of company law.143  
 
 
 138. Case C-212/97, Centros Ltd. v. Erhvervs-og Selskabsstyrelsen, 1999 E.C.R. I-1459; 
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I-10155; Case C-208/00, Überseering BV v. Nordic Constr. Co. Baumanagement GmbH, 2002 
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the European Union after Centros). 
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application of private company law mechanisms, the ECJ rebuffed by noting that they had not 
arisen “as the result of the normal operation of company law,” but were instead approved by 
the secretary of state pursuant to the privatization statute. Case C-98/01, Comm’n v. United 
Kingdom, 2003 E.C.R. I-4641, at para. 48. 
 142. See, e.g., Case C-98/01, Comm’n v. United Kingdom, 2003 E.C.R. I-4641; Case C-
483/99, Comm’n v. France, 2002 E.C.R. I-4781; Case C-367/98, Comm’n v. Portugal, 2002 
E.C.R. I-4731. The only golden share controversy to withstand ECJ scrutiny so far has been 
Case C-503/99, Comm’n v. Belgium, 2002 E.C.R. I-4809, where the Court held that “the 
objective pursued by the legislation at issue, namely the safeguarding of energy supplies in 
the event of a crisis, falls undeniably within the ambit of a legitimate public interest.” Id. at 
para. 46. 
 143. See, e.g., Stefan Grundmann & Florian Möslein, Golden Shares: State Control in 
Privatised Companies: Comparative Law, European Law and Policy Aspects, 2001 EUR. 
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The ECJ subsequently engaged in a broader scrutiny of corporate governance 
arrangements in the landmark challenge against Germany’s so-called Volkswagen 
law in Commission v. Germany.144 The Volkswagen Act of 1960, which privatized 
the firm, specified three charter provisions that came under attack as inconsistent 
with E.U. law: (i) a voting cap at 20% of total capital; (ii) a supermajority voting 
requirement of 80% for fundamental decisions that required 75% approval under 
general corporate law; and (iii) special board appointment rights to the federal 
government and the state of Lower Saxony.145 The court found that these provisions, 
combined with the 20% stake held by the state of Lower Saxony, constituted an 
impermissible infringement on the free movement of capital. It noted that while “the 
capping of voting rights is a recognised instrument of company law . . . there is a 
difference between a power made available to shareholders, who are free to decide 
whether or not they wish to use it, and a specific obligation imposed on shareholders 
by way of legislation.”146  
Following the Volkswagen case, scholars predicted that the ECJ would next 
engage in all-encompassing review of domestic company law, scrapping various 
corporate law rules that could restrict free movement of capital.147 Despite such 
warnings, however, the ECJ has never attempted such a broad form of “quality 
control” of corporate law against integrationist objectives. As elaborated in Part III 
below, this is not surprising. Given the multipurpose nature of corporate law 
arrangements, the elimination of all structural barriers to takeovers would be 
incredibly disruptive to current practices and difficult to implement. The result is that 
the states’ use of general corporate law rules for protectionist purposes has not only 
persisted but also intensified in recent years. 
Attempts to remove structural impediments to the market for corporate control 
have also failed, but not for lack of trying. The main regulatory initiative in this area 
was the Takeover Directive, which aimed to facilitate cross-border transactions. As 
articulated by the European Commission, the principal purposes of the Directive 
were not to reduce agency costs at the firm level but to promote a single capital 
market and increase European competitiveness.148  
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The Commission’s 1997 proposal for a Takeover Directive had gained some 
traction when it was surprisingly defeated in the final stage of the legislative process 
in 2001 after a change of heart by the German government. The backdrop of this 
opposition was the then recent hostile acquisition of Mannesmann by Vodafone, 
which instigated large German companies such as Volkswagen and BASF to lobby 
the government for fear that they too could fall into foreign hands.149 Germany felt 
that the board neutrality rule in the proposed Takeover Directive made its firms 
asymmetrically exposed to foreign acquisitions.150 While recent reforms had 
increased the contestability of control of German companies, potential targets in 
other jurisdictions continued to have structural protections in place.151  
In response to the Directive’s rejection by the European Parliament in 2001 by a 
margin of one vote, the Commission gathered a High Level Group of Company Law 
Experts to offer independent advice on the matter. The opening of the Group’s report 
noted that “[a]n important goal of the European Union is to create an integrated 
capital market in the Union,” and that “[t]he regulation of takeover bids is a key 
element of such an integrated market.”152 In order to appease concerns about the 
“level playing field” that had plagued the prior proposal, the Group insisted on board 
neutrality but proposed a so-called break-through rule, which would dismantle 
deviations from the one-share, one-vote standard once the bidder acquired 75% of 
the cash flow rights of the company.153 
The new proposal by the Commission based on the Group’s recommendations 
again encountered significant resistance. Germany continued to counter board 
neutrality. France and Sweden, whose companies relied heavily on voting disparities, 
opposed the breakthrough rule for failing to level the playing field with respect to 
companies that had a majority shareholder or adopted pyramidal structures.  
The impasse led to a compromise that essentially made the Directive’s key 
components nonbinding. It permitted states to opt out of both the breakthrough rule 
and the board neutrality rule, provided that individual companies could opt back into 
these rules.154 It also introduced the possibility of applying a “reciprocity” exception 
to the board neutrality rule, by which the rule would not apply if the acquirer were 
not subject to a similar regime.155 While the concept of reciprocity is a cherished one 
in international relations and affects popular attitudes toward foreign investment,156 
its embrace by the Takeover Directive is a clear, if odd, response to economic 
nationalism.157  
 
 
 149. Skog, supra note 74, at 296.  
 150. See supra note 69 and accompanying text. 
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The final version of the Takeover Directive illustrates the difficulties in 
overcoming the grip of nationalism on corporate law, even in a long-term, 
multilateral effort established for this precise purpose. In the end, by making the 
prohibition on takeover defenses optional, the Directive lost its teeth; it was “not 
worth the paper it’s written on,” in the words of the commissioner responsible for 
the proposal.158 Strikingly, most domestic legal reforms following the Directive 
embraced greater, rather than fewer, takeover defenses.159 More recently, growing 
apprehension about a Chinese buying spree has also led European countries (most 
notably Germany and France) to push for the adoption of E.U. legislation to monitor 
and restrict foreign investments through noncorporate law means.160 
F. Japan 
Japan’s traditional system of corporate governance based on keiretsu networks of 
cross-shareholdings, bank-centered finance, and life-long employment has attracted 
significant scholarly attention. Japan’s corporate system also stands out for being 
highly insulated from foreign influence. Levels of foreign direct investment (FDI) in 
the country are extraordinarily low and so is the incidence of foreign acquisitions.161 
Remarkably, Japan is the only developed economy that has yet to witness its first 
successful hostile takeover in the postwar era.162 
Such entrenchment of domestic control has coexisted both with a nominal lack of 
protectionist policies and with high levels of outward FDI by Japanese firms. In lieu 
of overt restrictions against foreign investors, Japan’s corporate governance system 
did most of the work—a strategy of stealth protectionism that a scholar labeled the 
“privatization of economic nationalism.”163 Indeed, the Japanese system of cross-
shareholdings arose deliberately as a defense against foreign takeovers in the 1960s 
and early 1970s, when Japan opened its capital markets as a result of its accession to 
the OECD.164 The keiretsu system of corporate governance featured prominently in 
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the “Structural Impediments Initiative” (SII), a round of bilateral U.S. and Japan 
trade negotiations in the late 1980s that aimed at addressing the perception that most 
barriers against foreign investment in Japan were informal in nature.165  
Even as cross-shareholdings dwindled and foreign investment rose since the 
banking crisis of the 1990s, as banks were forced to divest their shareholdings,166 
corporate law and ownership structures have continued to serve as a powerful 
weapon against foreign takeovers. Cross-shareholdings remain significant in smaller 
firms that are most vulnerable to foreign takeovers and hedge fund activism.167 
Moreover, when Japanese firms seemed exposed to foreign takeovers in the early 
2000s, the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) gathered experts in a 
Corporate Value Study Group to formulate a response. “Because of an increase in 
the desire of foreign firms to acquire Japanese companies,” government papers 
explained, “it is necessary to develop reasonable takeover defenses in order to cope 
with acquisitions that will have an adverse effect on regional employment.”168 Yet 
one of the four guiding principles of the Study Group was the absence of 
discrimination between foreign and Japanese firms, together with the enhancement 
of corporate value, global standards, and the expansion of choice.169  
This effort resulted in the enactment of Takeover Guidelines by METI and the 
Ministry of Justice, which relied heavily on Delaware law to endorse and regulate 
the use of takeover defenses.170 The Guidelines aimed to dispel doubts about the 
validity of takeover defenses in Japan, sanctioning the use of protective measures 
that had previously been challenged by Japanese courts.171 By borrowing from 
Delaware law, Japan embraced global standards that were not discriminatory in 
nature but granted managers significant leeway to fend off foreign takeover 
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threats.172 The Japanese government has since explicitly encouraged the adoption of 
poison pills to ward off foreign acquirers.173  
A broader picture of M&A activity in Japan further highlights the import of 
nationalist considerations. Japan went through a major wave of consolidation 
through friendly M&A transactions since the late 1990s, but foreign takeovers 
remained rare.174 Corporate law reforms that overtly discriminated against foreign 
buyers, by preventing or constraining them from using tax-favored share-for-share 
exchanges, played an important role in this outcome.175  
Concerns about foreign ownership in Japan are understandable in view of its 
potential to disrupt the country’s distinctive system of corporate governance. The 
traditional features of industrial cooperation and lifelong employment depend 
heavily on a loyal shareholder base embedded in Japan’s homogeneous business 
culture. Foreign owners are more likely to lack a similar commitment to a stakeholder 
orientation in corporate governance. In a “clash of capitalisms,” the increase in 
foreign investment in Japan during the 1990s was associated with greater downsizing 
and asset divestitures, especially in firms that lacked close ties to corporate groups 
and financial institutions.176  
G. Brazil 
The above discussion makes clear that nationalist influence on corporate law is 
prevalent among the highly developed jurisdictions that have been the focus of 
comparative corporate governance. The same phenomenon is also present in 
developing countries, which are especially well known for embracing economic 
nationalism from time to time in an effort to catch up.177 Take the example of Brazil. 
Nationalist objectives were paramount in the promulgation of Brazil’s Corporations 
Law (Law 6.404) and had a clear impact on ownership structures in Brazil. State 
ownership, disparate voting rights, shareholder agreements, and foreign ownership 
restrictions are among the devices used to keep major firms in local hands, 
profoundly affecting the corporate governance landscape.  
Enacted in 1976, policymakers overtly conceived Brazil’s Corporations Law as 
“an essential instrument for the creation and strengthening of national private 
enterprise.”178 Then Treasury Secretary Mário Henrique Simonsen resented the 
dearth of large domestic corporations under private control. Out of the twenty largest 
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Brazilian companies as of 1972, eleven were SOEs, seven were controlled by foreign 
investors, and only two were controlled by Brazilian private capital.179  
Economic nationalism inspired the adoption of various distinctive corporate law 
rules. The corporate statute qualifies the conduct of a controlling shareholder that is 
“harmful to the national interest” as one of the instances of “abuse of control power” 
resulting in controlling shareholder liability.180 According to the law’s official 
Exposition of Motives, the statute sought to impose on managers and shareholders a 
“new duty of loyalty” to consider the interests of the country, a duty that applied 
equally to domestic and foreign firms operating in Brazil.181 The statute also includes 
a symbolic, though easily circumventable, prohibition on subsidiaries that are wholly 
owned by a foreign company, with the purpose of “making clear that the statute bans 
the subordination of the interests of the national company to the foreign one.”182 In 
addition, only Brazilian residents may serve as corporate officers and members of 
the fiscal board (conselho fiscal), a restriction that applied to members of the board 
of directors (conselho de administração) until 2001.183 
Nationalist sentiment was also decisive in the embrace of state ownership in 
Brazil. In Brazil’s underdeveloped capital markets, the prospect of private ownership 
of large-scale enterprise was often unavailable. Faced with the alternatives of foreign 
ownership and state ownership, political support gravitated toward the latter.  
In 1953, the federal government incorporated Petrobras—which would later 
become one of the world’s largest oil companies—following a strong nationalistic 
campaign based on the slogan “the oil is ours.”184 For most of its history, foreigners 
could not hold shares in Petrobras.185 While foreign ownership was eventually 
permitted in a 1997 reform, and Petrobras began issuing ADRs in the New York 
Stock Exchange in 2000, the law continues to require the government to serve as the 
controlling shareholder of Petrobras by holding a majority of its voting shares.186  
Even during the heyday of neoliberal policies in the 1990s, which led to a wave 
of privatizations, concerns about national control did not disappear. Many SOEs 
were sold to groups of domestic (and sometimes foreign) investors bound by a 
shareholders’ agreement. Pension funds of SOEs, as well as the equity arm of 
Brazil’s National Development Bank (BNDES), figured prominently in these tight 
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control groups bound by shareholders’ agreements.187 As a result, the centrality of 
government players in corporate networks in Brazil increased following these 
privatizations.188  
These ownership arrangements relied heavily on new mechanisms of corporate 
law. In 2001, a legal reform to the corporations law significantly strengthened the 
effects of shareholders’ agreements, which, among other things, were allowed to bind 
directors’ votes.189 When the government sold its crown jewels, such as mining 
company Vale and aircraft manufacturer Embraer, it made sure to include golden 
shares requiring its consent on acquisitions (as well as voting caps, in the case of 
Embraer) to insulate these firms from foreign takeovers. Moreover, in the 2000s, the 
government spent billions of dollars in ambitious equity and debt infusions to 
promote national champions.190 Although corruption allegations have subsequently 
surfaced, nationalistic industrial policies had long lent legitimacy to such hefty 
government support.  
Similarly to other countries, the dissociation of cash flow and voting rights has 
also served to uphold domestic control in Brazil. In Petrobras, for instance, the use 
of nonvoting preferred shares permits the federal government to exercise uncontested 
corporate control over the company even though a majority of the shares is in the 
hands of private (and, these days, mostly foreign) investors.191 Yet the prevalence of 
foreign ownership seems to have a negative effect on prevailing attitudes toward 
investor protection. Despite recent instances of securities fraud associated with 
corruption scandals, the company is consistently portrayed as a victim, rather than a 
perpetrator.192 Meanwhile, commentators denounce the issuance of Petrobras ADRs 
on the New York Stock Exchange as “an inadmissible attack against our 
sovereignty,” arguing that U.S. securities class actions against the company violate 
the Brazilian public order and should not be recognized in the country.193  
H. United States 
Compared to continental Europe, Asia, and developing countries, nationalist 
considerations have played a comparatively modest role in U.S. corporate law and 
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governance in recent times.194 This goes a long way in explaining the neglect of this 
theme in the corporate governance literature, which is still largely U.S. centric. 
However, even if nationalist concerns about foreign ownership of corporations have 
been less visible in the United States, they have still left a mark on corporate 
governance arrangements. This is especially significant given that the United States 
has historically exhibited low levels of FDI compared to both developed and 
developing economies.195 Moreover, analogous protectionist tendencies against out-
of-state parties have been a dominant force in corporate lawmaking at the state level, 
even if they lack the same appeal as protectionist measures bolstered by references 
to national identity. 
When the United States was a developing economy in the nineteenth century, 
nationalist concerns had a visible impact on corporate governance arrangements. The 
charter of the First Bank of the United States, a crucial corporation in the country’s 
early history and the government’s fiscal agent, expressly disenfranchised foreign 
investors.196 In defending the charter provision that prohibited foreign shareholders 
from voting by proxy, Alexander Hamilton emphasized “the want of precautions to 
guard against a foreign influence insinuating itself into the Direction of the Bank.”197 
He warned that “[i]t seems scarcely reconcilable [sic] with a due caution to permit, 
that any but citizens should be eligible as Directors of a National Bank, or that 
nonresident foreigners should be able to influence the appointment of Directors by 
the votes of their proxies.”198  
Hamilton, who was otherwise a supporter of foreign capital,199 justified these 
measures by arguing that the Bank was “not a mere matter of private property, but a 
political machine of the greatest importance to the state.”200 While the proportion of 
its shares held abroad eventually reached over 70% of its capital, the Bank remained 
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entirely within U.S. control.201 Nevertheless, fears of foreign influence were a key 
factor behind the congressional decision not to recharter the Bank.202 
When Congress established the Second Bank of the United States in 1816, it again 
prevented foreign shareholders from voting.203 Yet the new Bank also attracted 
considerable interest from foreign (mostly British) investors, and nearly a third of 
the Bank’s stock came to be held abroad.204 The prevalence of foreign ownership 
was a central theme in President Andrew Jackson’s refusal to renew the charter of 
the Bank, which was then America’s largest business enterprise.205 In his veto 
message to the bill that sought to recharter the Bank, Jackson referred to foreign 
ownership and its inconveniences over twenty times.206 When the National Bank Act 
of 1864 created a system of federal bank chartering to finance the Civil War, 
nationalist considerations again reappeared in the rule limiting directorships in 
national banks to U.S. citizens.207  
Outside of the banking sector, foreign ownership was less conspicuous in the early 
part of the nineteenth century, but there were still nationalist responses.208 The 
protectionist instincts that polities show against nonmembers played out primarily at 
the state level. This tension is visible in the numerous controversies concerning what 
constituted permissible state law discrimination against the so-called foreign 
corporation—here understood as a corporation chartered not by another country, but 
by another state.  
Through the early nineteenth century, the creation of business corporations 
required special charters by the legislature, which were premised on the promotion 
of a local improvement and typically entailed monopoly privileges.209 These early 
corporations were territorial institutions, established in the state of residence of their 
founders and conducting most, if not all, of their business within the state.210 Some 
charters specifically required directors and officers to be state residents, and 
shareholder and board meetings to be held in the state.211  
More fundamentally, the prevailing legal doctrine at the time was that, as an 
artificial creature of the state, a business corporation existed only within the 
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incorporating sovereign’s territorial boundaries.212 Special charters granted by the 
state legislature typically banned corporations from operating outside of the territory. 
This rule also carried over to many general incorporation statutes that aimed to 
liberalize the incorporation process by eliminating the need for a special legislative 
charter.213 The right to operate out of state remained a privilege granted only by some 
special charters, which made it relatively rare.214 Until the Supreme Court’s 
commerce clause jurisprudence of the 1860s, states systematically discriminated 
against foreign corporations in tax and regulatory matters.215 
The emergence of the internal affairs rule in the U.S. federalist system—a key 
component of the “genius” of American corporate law216—was mostly an accident 
of history, not the result of a deliberate policy to promote regulatory competition or 
to curb agency costs.217 The internal affairs rule provides that the law of the state of 
incorporation governs the relationships among the corporation, its managers, and its 
shareholders. The early decisions articulating the doctrine in the 1860s contained a 
jurisdictional rule, according to which only the courts of the incorporating state had 
the power to address matters of internal affairs.218 Crucially, the doctrine emerged at 
a time where territorial ties to the chartering state prevailed, and firms had limited 
choice about where to incorporate.219  
This timing explains the lack of protectionist pressures against the internal affairs 
rule. Given the constraints on corporate mobility prevailing at the time of the rule’s 
initial articulation, even protectionist U.S. states had no reason to safeguard the 
application of their own corporate laws within their territory through a conflicts 
rule.220 This scenario stands in sharp contrast to the emergence of the real seat 
doctrine in Europe, which developed to restrain the cross-border mobility of 
corporations then well underway.221 Regulatory competition began in earnest with 
New Jersey’s active strategy to attract incorporations from out of state in the late 
nineteenth century by offering liberal charters to foreign firms irrespective of a 
requirement or expectation of state presence.222 
The success of regulatory competition for corporate charters in the United States 
is also a function of the constitutional constraints imposed on states’ protectionist 
tendencies. This is a critical, but often neglected, component of the U.S. institutional 
landscape. Some courts have gone so far as to suggest that the internal affairs doctrine 
 
 
 212. Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. 519, 588 (1839) (“It is very true that a corporation 
can have no legal existence out of the boundaries of the sovereignty by which it is created.”). 
 213. Tung, supra note 210, at 62. 
 214. Id. 
 215. Id. at 58–60. 
 216. ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW (1993). 
 217. Tung, supra note 210, at 33 (contending that “the doctrine’s origin had nothing to do 
with regulatory competition”).  
 218. Id. at 66. 
 219. Id. at 37. 
 220. Richard Buxbaum, The Origins of the American ‘Internal Affairs’ Rule in the 
Corporate Conflict of Laws, in FESTSCHRIFT FÜR GERHARD KEGEL ZUM 75. GEBURTSTAG 26 
JUNI 1987, at  84 (Hans-Joachim Musielak & Klaus Schurig eds., 1987). 
 221. Id. at 85.  
 222. Tung, supra note 210, at 38, 45, 57.  
2020] THE GRIP OF NATIONALISM  565 
 
is mandated by the U.S. Constitution.223 While there is scholarly support to this 
view,224 other commentators have questioned the constitutional stature of the internal 
affairs doctrine, not least because internal affairs are never purely “internal.”225  
Nevertheless, the Constitution’s commitment to economic integration has limited 
the states’ ability to discriminate against out-of-state firms, with significant 
consequences for corporate law. The U.S. Supreme Court’s 1869 decision in Paul v. 
Virginia226 effectively spurred the market for corporate charters.227 As discussed 
above, the status of foreign corporations was highly uncertain until then.228 Although 
Paul formally held that a state could lawfully exclude a foreign corporation that was 
not deemed to engage in interstate commerce, its “corollary” was that “a state had no 
power to exclude a corporation from doing interstate business.”229 This effectively 
permitted foreign corporations doing interstate business, which are those most 
vulnerable to protectionist behavior by host states, to shop for corporate charters at 
their convenience.  
However, the rise of regulatory competition did not eliminate the states’ 
protectionist instincts or their legal ability to restrict the powers of foreign 
corporations. Although the Supreme Court had limited the states’ ability to 
discriminate against out-of-state agents or prevent interstate commerce, it did not 
prevent states from excluding foreign corporations from carrying out other forms of 
business within the state.230 States typically required local chartering of regulated 
industries such as banking, insurance, and utility companies.231  
Nevertheless, even as states placed various restrictions on foreign corporations, 
they typically lacked similar constraints on foreign shareholders, arguably because 
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they were so rare.232 This asymmetric treatment allowed entrepreneurs to take 
advantage of a new organizational form, the holding company, to create multistate 
businesses while complying with state chartering requirements. Under this structure, 
the operating corporation remained local for regulatory purposes; only the 
shareholder (the holding company) was foreign.233  
The holding company also facilitated the emergence of pyramidal ownership 
structures—a mechanism by which company A holds the majority of voting shares 
in company B, which holds the majority of voting shares in company C, and so on. 
Corporate pyramids permit the concentration of corporate control in the hands of 
shareholders having a modest economic interest in the firm. Pyramidal structures 
were particularly common among U.S. utility companies through the early twentieth 
century, though a combination of populist-inspired tax and regulatory reforms in the 
1930s dismantled them.234  
Corporate governance scholars are aware of the decline of pyramidal structures in 
the United States today (even as they remain prevalent in other countries),235 but their 
origins are less appreciated. While multiple factors played a part, observers at the 
time highlighted the role of regulatory restrictions against foreign corporations, 
which pyramidal structures then helped evade.236 In his best-selling book Main Street 
and Wall Street, William Ripley largely absolved management for the creation of 
utility pyramids. “Utility managements,” he argued, “are less to blame for this 
overextended situation than are the people of the United States,” as “many states 
require that public utilities be conducted by domestic corporations; else they may be 
denied the enjoyment of such rights such as that of eminent domain.”237 
The newfound circumvention of restrictions against foreign corporations, 
combined with the rise of charter competition with New Jersey and then Delaware 
leading the ranks, significantly mitigated the effects of state protectionism on 
corporate law. Yet protectionist considerations also played a role in the enactment of 
the so-called “blue sky” laws, the state-level regulations aimed at curbing fraudulent 
issuances of securities through disclosure mandates and administrative review of 
merit. Blue sky laws were arguably the most important state effort at corporate 
regulation until the takeover boom of the 1980s, inspiring the adoption of federal 
securities regulation in the 1930s.238  
 
 
 232. Hovenkamp, supra note 230, at 86. 
 233. Id. at 85. 
 234. See ROE, supra note 11, at 107–08; Steven A. Bank & Brian R. Cheffins, The 
Corporate Pyramid Fable, 84 BUS. HIST. REV. 435, 438, 442 (2010) (arguing that pyramids 
were important only in the utilities sector, with the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 
1935 being responsible for their demise); Randall Morck & Bernard Yeung, Dividend 
Taxation and Corporate Governance, 19 J. ECON. PERSP. 163, 176 (2005). 
 235. Enriques et al., supra note 72, at 82. 
 236. JAMES C. BONBRIGHT & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE HOLDING COMPANY: ITS PUBLIC 
SIGNIFICANCE AND REGULATION 33 (1932) (attributing the creation of holding companies as a 
response to the legal obstacle “created by the desire of various states to keep the ownerships 
of various types of enterprise under a domestic corporation”).  
 237. WILLIAM Z. RIPLEY, MAIN STREET AND WALL STREET 296 (1927).  
 238. Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Origin of the Blue Sky Laws, 70 TEX. L. 
REV. 347, 348 (1991). 
2020] THE GRIP OF NATIONALISM  567 
 
Whether blue sky laws were a public-spirited response to the proliferation of 
securities fraud or the artful product of interest group pressure remains the object of 
debate. In any case, it is clear that protectionist dynamics contributed to their 
adoption. Legal reforms to protect outside investors are generally hard to come by in 
the absence of a major scandal or crisis, since investors are a dispersed group that 
face significant collective action problems compared to managers and controlling 
shareholders.239 However, the lopsided nature of the protection afforded by blue sky 
laws mitigated this problem: only in-state investors benefited from regulatory 
protection under blue sky laws, while corporate promoters were often based out of 
state.240  
In contrast to the conventional view that blue sky laws sought to protect investors, 
Jonathan Macey and Geoffrey Miller have argued that special interests played a 
significant part in their enactment.241 Small banks and local borrowers stood to 
benefit from blue sky legislation as a means of reducing competition for funds from 
out-of-state securities firms during a period of credit scarcity.242 Protectionism was 
an explicit motivation behind the pioneering blue sky legislation from the state of 
Kansas. Regulatory entrepreneur J.N. Dolley, who was instrumental in the passage 
of the act, explicitly pointed to the millions of dollars being “taken from Kansas” to 
out-of-state firms.243  
While U.S. states were also highly protectionist of local champions and their 
headquarters, as will be examined further below, they were less interested in 
generally promoting American nationalism against non-U.S. capital.244 The result is 
that policies towards promoting or maintaining U.S. ownership were primarily 
championed by the federal government. Because corporate law in the United States 
had become a matter of state law, the United States appears to have relied more than 
other countries on administrative law, rather than corporate governance mechanisms, 
to protect its national industry.  
It is revealing, however, that the enactment of the Williams Act of 1968—the only 
piece of U.S. federal legislation targeting hostile takeovers to date—had the foreign 
takeover threat against Columbia Motion Pictures as its poster child for the perils of 
unregulated acquisition markets. Although Senator Williams first proposed 
legislation aimed at deterring tender offers in 1965, the version of the bill that was 
eventually enacted was cosponsored by Senator Kuchel of California, who became 
an ardent critic of the tender offer regime when Columbia Motion Pictures faced a 
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tender offer from the Banque de Paris et de Pays Bas.245 In his 1966 letter to the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (which was attached to the bill), Kuchel 
emphasized the importance of Columbia to the California economy and warned that 
“[t]his power of life or death over any American business or industry, directly or 
indirectly in the hands of a foreign group, is patently against the national interest.”246 
He also specifically mentioned the Columbia incident to argue that the existing 
securities regime “opens up the possibilities of all kinds of foreign interests coming 
in here and participating in attempts to control various communications media.”247 
While the reference to foreign takeover threats is useful in garnering political 
support, Columbia never faced a real risk of falling under French control. The reason 
for the takeover’s failure at that time, as well as in the past, lay in foreign ownership 
restrictions long enshrined in federal law. The Communications Act of 1934 
prohibited foreign shareholders from owning more than one-fifth of a U.S. company 
with broadcasting holdings, a restriction that applied to Columbia as an indirect 
owner of TV stations.248 The Communications Act was only one of various industry-
specific restrictions on foreign ownership and control enacted after World War I, 
which also encompassed marine shipping, aircraft manufacturing, and the oil 
industry.249 Apart from banking, security concerns ostensibly drove these 
restrictions, even though FDI played a comparatively modest role in the U.S. 
economy.250  
Prior to the enactment of formal legislation preventing foreign control of radio 
and telecommunications, the pursuit of domestic control developed informally, such 
as when General Electric forced the American Marconi, which was then under British 
control, to sell its radio patents at the encouragement of the U.S. Navy in 1919.251 
The purchase and subsequent transfer of these assets to the newly created Radio 
Corporation of America (RCA) served the Navy’s objectives of ensuring domestic 
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control of the radio industry without having to undertake control themselves.252 The 
RCA’s charter prevented foreigners from holding more than 20 percent of the stock 
and serving as directors or officers, and granted a government representative “the 
right of discussion and presentation in the board of the Government’s views and 
interests concerning matters coming before the board.”253 This type of private 
domestic alternative to foreign ownership is one of the reasons why the United States 
successfully resisted the appeal of state ownership during the twentieth century.254  
Since the 1970s, the primary mode of response to foreign threats has taken the 
form of federal executive review of foreign direct investments in view of national 
security concerns.255 In response to the increased vulnerability of U.S. firms due to 
the depreciation of the U.S. dollar, President Ford established the Committee on 
Foreign Investments in the United States (CFIUS) in 1975, which was in charge of 
monitoring the impact of foreign investment, but lacked the authority to block 
acquisitions.256 In the 1980s, mounting anxiety about Japanese acquisitions of U.S. 
firms—which peaked after Fujitsu’s proposed acquisition of Fairchild, a 
semiconductor manufacturer—led Congress to enact the Exon Florio Amendment to 
the Defense Production Act of 1950. Exon Florio authorizes the President to block 
acquisitions that threaten “national security.”257 In 1992, following the failed attempt 
by a French SOE to acquire a defense contractor, Congress enacted a new 
amendment mandating CFIUS to undertake a mandatory investigation when the 
acquirer in a transaction that could affect national security is “controlled by or acting 
on behalf of a foreign government.”258  
In the 2000s, public outcry and political pressure derailed major foreign 
acquisitions through informal means due to national security concerns.259 In view of 
these incidents and the growing appetite of foreign SOEs and sovereign wealth funds 
for U.S. companies, Congress enacted the Foreign Investment and National Security 
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Act of 2007, strengthening the process of CFIUS review and imposing reporting 
obligations to Congress.260 This change greatly increased the number of CFIUS 
investigations and appears to have deterred foreign takeovers.261 The recently 
enacted Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act of 2018 (FIRRMA) 
significantly expands the scope of review of foreign investment in the United States 
by requiring CFIUS to vet, among other things, noncontrolling foreign investment in 
companies that deal in critical technology, critical infrastructure, or personal data of 
U.S. citizens.262 
In summary, the United States has not been immune to nationalist hostility 
towards foreign ownership.263 Although levels of FDI have been historically low in 
the United States, most concerns about foreign presence have been met with foreign 
ownership restrictions and administrative review of foreign investments by the 
federal government as opposed to corporate law. There is new evidence, however, 
that the federal government strongly intervenes in the corporate governance structure 
of foreign-owned defense contractors to safeguard national security.264 
Meanwhile, states as corporate lawmakers were strongly statist in their reaction 
to the hostile takeover wave of the 1980s. Since Delaware overtook New Jersey as 
the most popular state of incorporation, U.S. companies have traditionally 
incorporated either in their home state or in Delaware.265 This means that, for non-
Delaware targets, hostile bids typically pitted the interests of out-of-state bidders and 
public shareholders, on the one hand, against those of local managers and workers, 
on the other. In view of the political deficit of noncitizens and the powerful political 
alliance between elite and labor interests, it is no surprise that state legislatures 
typically favored the latter.  
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These are the same forces that prodded the enactment of protective legislation in 
most countries where hostile takeover threats frequently come from abroad. Their 
presence in the U.S. federal system, but absence in the United Kingdom’s centralized 
system of government, also helps explain why these two Anglo-Saxon and 
financially developed jurisdictions took opposite approaches to the regulation of 
hostile takeovers.266 Even the most passionate advocates of regulatory competition 
have pointed to its shortcomings in the U.S. takeover context.267 
Indeed, the most common scenario prompting state antitakeover legislation was a 
feared or ongoing acquisition attempt of a major local company by an out-of-state 
firm.268 Connecticut enacted its antitakeover statute at the request of the Aetna Life 
and Casualty Insurance Company; Minnesota did the same at the request of Dayton 
Hudson, and the list goes on.269 Massachusetts, in turn, reformed its corporate laws 
in an emergency session to impose staggered boards on all firms chartered in the state 
in response to the takeover attempt of Massachusetts-based Norton Company by 
BTR, a British firm.270 The campaign against the Norton takeover—which mobilized 
managers, workers, and politicians—dramatically played the nationalist card by 
comparing BTR’s tender with the British invasion of America during the 
Revolutionary War and equating it with “another attempt by a foreign power to 
interfere with our ability to shape our own [destiny].”271 
State antitakeover statutes impose externalities on other states:272 they produce 
concentrated local benefits in the form of continued employment, while its efficiency 
costs are diffuse and disproportionately borne by out-of-state bidders and 
shareholders. This helps explain why states have been far more enthusiastic about 
antitakeover legislation than the federal government.273 Federal lawmakers faced a 
different scenario, as the majority of bidders during the takeover wave of the 1980s 
were U.S. rather than foreign firms.274 Even so, there were various federal takeover 
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bills aimed specifically at acquisitions by foreigners,275 which were usually proposed 
with the goal of frustrating an ongoing hostile takeover attempt.276  
U.S. constitutional law also played an important role in moderating the states’ 
protectionist tendencies in this area. When the takeover boom in the 1980s prompted 
a flood of protectionist legislation by several states, the Supreme Court intervened. 
In Edgar v. MITE,277 the Supreme Court invalidated the Illinois exemplar of the first 
generation of state takeover laws. The statute in question required advance filing and 
administrative review prior to the launch of a tender offer and had broad 
jurisdictional reach.278 It covered not only corporations chartered in Illinois, but also 
foreign corporations that had ten Illinois shareholders or their principal office in 
Illinois.279 Noting that “the Illinois law on its face would apply even if not a single 
one of Chicago Rivet’s shareholders were a resident of Illinois,” Justice White’s 
opinion for the Court found that the law imposed an excessive burden on interstate 
commerce.280  
Undeterred by this first blow, states quickly passed a second generation of statutes 
designed to withstand constitutional scrutiny. While the states deployed different 
rules to deter hostile takeovers, the second generation of antitakeover legislation 
relied on mechanisms of corporate law (as opposed to administrative review) and 
applied only to corporations chartered in the state.281 They therefore epitomized the 
use of corporate law to promote stealth protectionism. In blessing Indiana’s control 
share acquisition statute in CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, the U.S. 
Supreme Court found the fact that the statute would apply most often to out-of-state 
bidders as insufficient to render it discriminatory to interstate commerce.282 The 
Court seemed particularly impressed by the fact that the statute looked like “a generic 
provision of state corporate law that regulated the voting rights of shareholders.”283 
While the Court permitted Indiana to enact legislation that was protectionist in 
intention and effect (even if not facially so), it highlighted the role of the internal 
affairs rule in promoting capital markets and economic integration.284  
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Since CTS, states have enacted third-generation statutes restricting business 
combinations, validating takeover defenses such as poison pills, and permitting 
directors to consider the interests of a broad set of constituencies. Curiously, several 
state constituency statutes specifically permit directors to consider “the economy of 
the state and Nation” in addition to the interests of employees, customers, the 
community, and the like.285 States have also strived to maintain local control of major 
companies in other ways, as illustrated by the extraordinary protectionist measures 
undertaken by the state of Pennsylvania to prevent the Hershey charitable trust from 
selling its controlling interest in the Hershey Company.286  
Delaware, the apparent winner of the state competition for corporate charters in 
the United States, is not subject to the same protectionist pressures as other states. 
Hosting a larger proportion of potential bidders than other states,287 but virtually no 
workers, managers, or shareholders of target companies, Delaware embraced 
antitakeover laws only later and in more restrictive fashion than other states. This 
means that Delaware supplies market-oriented corporate law that is driven by the 
state’s desire to attract incorporations and maximize the revenue it obtains with 
franchise fees. Contrast this with other states that generally offer politics-oriented 
corporate law that is shaped by the interests of its local constituencies and therefore 
shows a strong protectionist orientation.288 
Although the merits of takeover defenses are hotly contested, most scholars 
believe that Delaware’s takeover jurisprudence is more managerialist than socially 
optimal,289 and—what is significant for our purposes—at least partially the product 
of competitive pressures originating from the protectionist laws offered by other 
states.290 Ironically, other jurisdictions, such as Japan, have since embraced the 
protectionist elements of Delaware corporate law to pursue their own nationalist 
objectives.291  
Overall, U.S. corporate law is what it is because of a deep constitutional 
commitment to economic integration mitigating the states’ protectionist impulses, 
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which nevertheless have left a clear mark on corporate law. The constitutional 
commitment to economic integration also guaranteed that U.S. firms faced stronger 
competition in product and service markets at home and thereby achieved greater 
productivity than their foreign counterparts.292 The economic power of U.S. 
multinationals, in turn, was historically an important force behind nationalist 
responses in other jurisdictions, though China has recently replaced the United States 
as the most feared foreign acquirer prompting the adoption of protectionist policies. 
II. THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF CONTROL NATIONALISM  
As we saw in Part I, governments around the world have assiduously pursued 
nationalist policies through corporate governance arrangements, but are these efforts 
justified? There is a large body of literature on the economic effects of nationalist 
policies, especially with respect to international trade. The conventional view among 
economists, dating back to Adam Smith and David Ricardo, is that protectionist 
barriers to trade not only reduce global wealth but also impoverish the jurisdiction 
imposing protectionist restrictions. Under this view, jurisdictions will benefit even if 
they open their borders unilaterally, though reciprocity can be useful as a bargaining 
tool to obtain greater concessions from other jurisdictions and augment the scope and 
the gains from free trade.293 From an international perspective, another time-honored 
argument is that international trade promotes peace.294  
While this view continues to have supporters, some important qualifications have 
since emerged. First, there is a case for protecting “infant industries” in developing 
countries so that they stand a chance to compete against their well-established 
counterparts abroad.295 Second, there is also a case for strategic trade policy, as when 
government policy affects the terms of oligopolistic competition to transfer the 
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excess returns from foreign to domestic companies.296 This means that appropriately 
formulated government intervention can help a country increase its welfare at 
another country’s expense, though such “beggar-thy-neighbor” policies often place 
countries in a prisoner’s dilemma where intervention can be individually rational but 
less beneficial than a coordinated choice not to intervene. Third, even free trade at 
its best produces winners as well as losers, and uncompensated losses may increase 
inequality and thereby reduce overall welfare.297 Finally, and relatedly, free trade 
may undercut social norms and bargains embodied in national laws.298  
Given the empirical difficulties of formulating sensible government interventions 
and the risk of capture of the political process by special interests, most economists 
continue to favor free trade at least as a “rule of thumb” in a world of government 
failure.299 There have been great strides in promoting multilateral legal commitments 
to free trade, culminating in the establishment of the World Trade Organization in 
1995, even if many barriers persist. International trade law, however, focuses 
primarily on cross-border restrictions to the flow of goods and services. It does little 
to constrain existing barriers to international investment, for which a multilateral 
legal framework is lacking.300  
The normative debate about the merits of FDI is less robust than with respect to 
trade, but no less complex. FDI is defined as a cross-border equity investment in 
which the foreign investor exerts corporate influence over the enterprise in the host 
country.301 This distinguishes FDI from mere portfolio investments, which carry no 
influence or control rights.302 Foreign portfolio investment, which can bring both 
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benefits and risks to host countries,303 also has an indirect effect on corporate laws304 
but is not typically as salient as FDI.  
FDI comes in two forms: greenfield investments, which involve the establishment 
of new ventures, and mergers and acquisitions (M&A) of existing firms. Both modes 
of FDI can be contentious, but takeovers of existing local firms are especially 
divisive.305 Corporate law tools can be used to hamper both greenfield investments 
and M&A, but they are, as we have seen, especially relevant with respect to the latter.  
Nationalist resistance to FDI requires explanation. Unlike international trade, 
which assumes foreign production, FDI does not necessarily entail the outsourcing 
of jobs to another jurisdiction. The prevailing understanding today is that FDI 
substitutes for international trade in some cases but complements it in others.306 Yet 
even liberal-minded observers have occasionally argued that the case for FDI that 
displaces domestic control of major firms is weaker than the case for free trade.307  
This, however, begs the question: why does foreign control of local firms appear 
to be so troublesome? Why does it matter to the general population that a given firm 
is controlled by local, rather than foreign, elites? 
One simple answer is that it should not matter. Resistance to foreign control is 
simply the result of local elites clinging to their corporate privileges. In this view, 
disapproval of foreign acquisitions by the public at large lacks a rational basis. For 
Marx, nationalism was essentially a superstructural strategy to legitimize the 
interests of the bourgeoisie.308 
There are, however, theoretical arguments and some empirical evidence 
suggesting that the nationality of corporate ownership and control can make a 
difference. From a functional perspective, corporate ownership matters because it 
confers residual control rights on shareholders to determine how the firm will behave 
beyond what is required by its contractual obligations and the applicable government 
regulations. In practice, entrenched managers and controlling shareholders retain 
significant discretion about the extent to which corporations will pursue financial 
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returns or protect stakeholder interests, as well as the strategies it will use to further 
its goals.309  
There are different reasons why, at least in theory, domestic controllers are more 
likely to exercise their residual control rights for the benefit of local welfare. First, 
local shareholders and managers may be more likely to promote the interests of other 
stakeholders even if they do not benefit financially from it. This is because they 
derive greater nonpecuniary private benefits of control—in the form of a good 
reputation, influence, and recognition—from actions that benefit their communities, 
ranging from the preservation of local headquarters to the promotion of good 
working conditions and charitable contributions.  
Second, and relatedly, domestic controllers share the prevailing local culture and 
values, and are therefore more willing and able to rely on existing social norms to 
promote coordination. This role will be more pronounced in economies that place 
greater weight on government and interfirm coordination compared to the type of 
market arrangements that exist in Germany and Japan. Consistent with this view, 
coordinated market economies appear to be far more resistant to foreign acquisitions 
than liberal market economies.310  
Third, local managers and especially controlling shareholders are more likely to 
have a symbiotic relationship with the national or local political regime. Their 
fortune is more likely to be tied with the stability and success of the country, and 
they are more prone to collaborate with the state’s pursuit of public policy in 
exchange for benefits in other dealings with the government.311 Whether viewed as 
sincere loyalty or quid pro quo, local controlling shareholders and managers tend to 
be more aligned with the state’s interests, thus further promoting nationalist 
objectives.  
To be sure, the state has other means to influence corporate action beyond relying 
on the spontaneous loyalty of local controllers or on informal quid pro quos. It can 
always mandate a given course of action through laws and regulations. Nevertheless, 
ownership still matters, as regulations, like contracts, cannot fully circumscribe the 
residual control powers associated with ownership.312 Moreover, ownership will 
matter more where states’ regulatory powers are weak, which is the case in many 
jurisdictions pursuing nationalist policies. Interestingly, certain countries with 
relatively open takeover markets and a strong regulatory apparatus—such as the 
United States and especially the United Kingdom—appear to be more willing to 
approve foreign acquisitions by relying on contractual commitments with respect to 
post-closing conduct.313 
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local business groups remains dubious, however. See Tarun Khanna & Yishay Yafeh, Business 
Groups in Emerging Markets: Paragons or Parasites?, 45 J. ECON. LIT. 331 (2007).  
 312. The scope of these powers varies from state to state. See Curtis J. Milhaupt, Property 
Rights in Firms, 84 VA. L. REV. 1145 (1998). 
 313. This approach is also popular in Canada, which has successfully enforced in court the 
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Critics of FDI have posited that foreign- and domestic-owned firms exhibit 
fundamentally different behavioral patterns. Alice Amsden describes a multinational 
operating abroad as a “bureaucratic animal,” whereas a domestic-owned firm 
epitomizes the “Schumpeterian ideal.”314 Foreign-owned companies are less likely 
to innovate in host countries and tend to retain the lion’s share of the high-paying 
managerial and scientific jobs in their home jurisdictions.315 In this view, FDI is 
harmful where market failures exist, since foreign firms can crowd out the more 
beneficial presence of local firms.316 FDI supporters, in turn, regard it as a source of 
much-needed investment, productivity gains, and technological spillovers.317 
The existing literature on the economic consequences of FDI is inconclusive.318 
There is evidence that foreign firms have higher productivity and pay higher wages 
than their domestic counterparts, but the effects of spillovers on local firms’ 
productivity are unclear.319 There also appears to be no consistent relationship 
between FDI and host country economic growth.320 There are countries that have 
 
 
undertakings given by United States Steel Corporation under the Investment Canada Act. See 
U.S. Steel Corp. v. Att’y Gen. of Canada, [2011] F.C.A. 176 (Can.). 
 314. Alice H. Amsden, Nationality of Firm Ownership in Developing Countries: Who 
Should ‘Crowd Out’ Whom in Imperfect Markets?, in INDUSTRIAL POLICY AND DEVELOPMENT: 
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF CAPABILITIES ACCUMULATION 410 (Mario Cimoli, Giovanni Dosi 
& Joseph E. Stiglitz eds., 2009).  
 315. Id. at 412 (describing foreign-owned firms as “decapitated creatures”). See also PETER 
EVANS, DEPENDENT DEVELOPMENT 102 (1979) (describing the absence of “pioneering” by 
foreign capital in Brazil).   
 316. See Amsden, supra note 314, at 414–15 (ascribing the superior economic performance 
of Asia with respect to Latin America to the lower levels of foreign control in the former).  
 317. See, e.g., Paul M. Romer, Idea Gaps and Object Gaps in Economic Development, 32 
J. MON. ECON. 543 (1993) (arguing that FDI can help close “idea gaps” in underdeveloped 
economies).  
 318. Robert E. Lipsey & Fredrik Sjöholm, The Impact of Inward FDI on Host Countries: 
Why Such Different Answers?, in DOES FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT PROMOTE 
DEVELOPMENT? 23 (Theodore H. Moran, Edward Montgomery Graham & Magnus Blomström 
eds., 2005) (“[On] almost every aspect of this question [of how inward FDI affects host 
countries] there is a wide range of empirical results in academic literature with little sign of 
convergence.”).  
 319. For an influential review of the literature, see Robert Lipsey, Home and Host Country 
Effects of FDI (NBER Working Paper Series, Working Paper No. 9293, 2002), 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w9293.pdf [https://perma.cc/ABE4-KBZX]; see also Beata 
Smarzynska Javorcik, Does Foreign Direct Investment Increase the Productivity of Domestic 
Firms?: In Search of Spillovers Through Backward Linkages, 94 AM. ECON. REV. 605 (2004) 
(finding that, in contrast to earlier literature, there were positive productivity spillovers from 
FDI in Lithuania).   
 320. See Lipsey, supra note 319, at 55 (“[T]he results of these studies indicate that the size 
of inward FDI stocks or flows, relative to GDP, is not related in any consistent way to rates of 
growth.”); see also Maria Carkovic & Ross Levine, Does Foreign Direct Investment 
Accelerate Economic Growth?, in DOES FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT PROMOTE 
DEVELOPMENT? 197 (Theodore H. Moran, Edward Montgomery Graham & Magnus 
Blomström eds., 2005) (“[T]he exogenous component of FDI does not exert a robust, positive 
influence on economic growth.”). 
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prospered under both liberal and hostile FDI regimes.321 An empirical study by IMF 
economists has found that trade openness reduces inequality, while FDI appears to 
increase it.322  
The existing evidence on the effects of foreign takeovers, in particular, is also 
mixed. A leading concern is that foreign firms will move R&D activity to their 
headquarters. U.S. multinationals, for instance, use 84% of their R&D budgets at 
home.323 Empirical studies have not completely dissipated this fear, especially with 
respect to developing countries.324 Foreign acquirers have often discontinued R&D 
activities in Latin America, but in other contexts the effects have been neutral or 
positive.325 The record of foreign takeovers on host country productivity gains and 
employment outcomes is also mixed.326 Moreover, the welfare effects of foreign 
takeovers span well beyond the location of R&D activities. They may not only affect 
domestic and foreign workers but also, through their effects on competition and 
governance incentives, domestic and foreign consumers and shareholders.   
This unclear picture about the effects of FDI and foreign takeovers helps fuel the 
powerful domestic alliance favoring domestic control of industry. However, it does 
not explain why corporate law, rather than other regulatory instruments, is often the 
preferred conduit for nationalist ambitions, a topic to which I now turn.  
III. WHY CORPORATE LAW?  
The grip of nationalism on corporate law can appear puzzling at first. After all, 
corporate law rules are neither necessary nor sufficient to accomplish protectionist 
 
 
 321. Linsi, supra note 110, at 17 (citing Ireland and Singapore as an example of the former, 
and Japan, Korea and China as an example of the latter).   
 322. See Jaumotte et al., supra note 297, at 291. 
 323. Fear and Favour: Foreign Takeovers, supra note 130.  
 324. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT PERSPECTIVES 
2007: FREEDOM OF INVESTMENT IN A CHANGING WORLD 85 (2007) (“Empirical work on the 
question of the effect of foreign takeovers on existing R&D capabilities provides no definitive 
answers.”); see also Alice H. Amsden, Ted Tschang & Akira Goto, Do Foreign Companies 
Conduct R&D in Developing Countries? (Asia Dev. Bank Inst., Working Paper No. 14, 2001) 
(stating that R&D activity in developing country rarely encompasses basic research or even 
applied research). 
 325. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., supra note 324, at 85; see also UNITED 
NATIONS, WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2005: TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND THE 
INTERNATIONALIZATION OF R&D 143–46 (2005), https://unctad.org/en/Docs/wir2005_en.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/PGW9-9FXJ].  
 326. See, e.g., Martin Conyon et al., The Productivity and Wage Effects of Foreign 
Acquisition in the United Kingdom, 50 J. IND. ECON. 85 (2002) (finding that both domestic and 
foreign acquisitions are associated with higher wages and increases in productivity); John P. 
Geluebcke, The Impact of Foreign Takeovers: Comparative Evidence from Foreign and 
Domestic Acquisitions in Germany, 47 APP. ECON. 739 (2015) (“The results for German 
manufacturing indicate a negative impact of foreign takeovers on employment and no 
productivity improvements.”); Kristiina Huttunen, The Effects of Foreign Acquisition on 
Employment and Wages: Evidence from Finnish Establishments, 89 REV. ECON. STAT. 497 
(2007) (finding that foreign acquisitions lead to higher wages but lower levels of employment 
of highly educated workers).  
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objectives. They are not necessary because countries can, and often do, enact 
regulatory restrictions on foreign investments or otherwise discriminate against 
foreign interests. They are not sufficient because corporate law mechanisms do not 
guarantee the pursuit of nationalist policies when they are not in the interest of the 
corporation’s managers and shareholders. Dual-class structures and takeover 
defenses can only assist national objectives if managers and controlling shareholders 
do not want to lose control to foreign parties. They are ineffective when corporate 
insiders are eager to sell at an attractive price, which can be a problem if the takeover 
imposes externalities on other national constituencies such as workers, communities, 
and the government treasury.  
  In view of this, most, if not all, jurisdictions continue to impose restrictions on 
foreign ownership of business corporations in special cases.327 These restrictions—
which apply irrespective of the eagerness of corporate insiders to sell off—can take 
different forms. Most countries continue to impose ownership limits that ban foreign 
ownership of firms in certain strategic industries beyond a certain threshold of 
stockholdings or voting rights.  
Alternatively, or in addition, jurisdictions may subject foreign acquisitions to 
regulatory review and approval requirements to promote certain public policy 
objectives, such as ensuring the provision of public services or national security. The 
U.S. system of CFIUS review illustrates this approach, which has been increasingly 
embraced by other jurisdictions.328 Governments may also attempt to dissuade 
foreign acquisitions through informal means, often with significant success.329 
Moreover, governments may require foreign acquirers to make special commitments 
to post-closing actions in the host country.330 Through post-closing undertakings or 
commitments, foreign acquirers and buyers rely on contractual promises to 
compensate for the potential loss of loyalty associated with foreign ownership. That 
is, contracts substitute for ownership.  
By targeting only foreign owners, these restrictions appear to be more tailored to 
nationalist purposes and less disruptive of the governance landscape. Why, then, is 
 
 
 327. For an inventory of national rules discriminating against foreign investment, see Org. 
for ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., NATIONAL TREATMENT FOR FOREIGN-CONTROLLED 
ENTERPRISES: INCLUDING ADHERING COUNTRIES EXCEPTION TO NATIONAL TREATMENT (2013), 
https://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/investment-policy/national-treatment-instrument-english.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/A5SS-PR63].  
 328. See Frank Proust, Screening of Foreign Direct Investment in Strategic Sectors, 
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT (Oct. 20, 2019), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/legislative-train 
/theme-a-balanced-and-progressive-trade-policy-to-harness-globalisation/file-screening-of-
foreign-direct-investment-in-strategic-sectors [https://perma.cc/G2EP-UTAZ] (describing 
recent initiatives in the European Union).   
 329. I. Serdar Dinc & Isil Erel, Economic Nationalism in Mergers and Acquisitions, 68 J. 
FIN. 2471 (2013) (finding that national governments in the European Union were significantly 
more likely to decry foreign takeovers than domestic ones). The authors also find that such 
nonregulatory opposition not only hindered the deals in question but also had a chilling effect 
on future foreign bids in the country. Id. at 2472. 
 330. For the United Kingdom, see supra Section I.D. For the United States, see Milhaupt, 
supra note 165, at 13 (stating that Japanese firms investing in the United States in the 1980s 
made public commitments to maintain existing headquarters and factories to appease local 
fears). 
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the use of corporate law for nationalist purposes so popular? One reason is that blunt 
foreign ownership restrictions do not differentiate between greenfield investments 
and foreign acquisitions, with the latter being more controversial and politically 
unpopular. Corporate law provisions, in turn, are more likely to disproportionately 
affect foreign takeovers compared to greenfield FDI. Another factor is that 
nationalist corporate laws do not impinge on the controllers’ interest in divesting 
their stockholdings if they so wish and are therefore more favorable to domestic elites 
than coarse regulatory restrictions.  
Perhaps a more fundamental reason is that regulations that overtly discriminate 
against foreign investors are costly from an international relations perspective. Most 
countries simultaneously want to prevent foreign ownership of their national 
champions and enable, if not encourage, acquisitions of corporate targets by their 
own firms abroad. However, this duplicitous position is hardly defensible, giving rise 
to concerns about reciprocity. 
Reciprocity in takeovers matters, first, because of its intuitive and popular appeal 
in embodying an ideal of fairness. A recent empirical study found that reciprocity is 
a major determinant of public opinion with respect to foreign investments.331 Second, 
in the absence of reciprocity, in the long run, there will be more firms coming from 
countries with closed takeover markets than from countries with open ones, in ways 
that do not necessarily reflect efficiency advantages.  
In this context, corporate law barriers operate as a form of stealth protectionism. 
Corporate law rules have broad applicability and are often nondiscriminatory on their 
face. There is major theoretical debate about the proper ends of corporate law—if to 
protect shareholders only or stakeholders more generally—as well as empirical 
uncertainty about the best means to accomplish these ends.332 Specifically, there is 
still considerable controversy about whether corporate law devices that entrench 
controlling shareholders and managers are an inefficient source of agency costs or 
efficient tools to protect long-term specific investments, promote entrepreneurial 
vision, and tackle the information and coordination problems facing outside 
shareholders.333 At the same time, there is broad agreement that corporate law rules 
can have different effects depending on the underlying context, and that different 
firm characteristics may require distinct legal regimes.334 This suggests that corporate 
 
 
 331. Adam S. Chilton, Helen V. Milner & Dustin Tingley, Reciprocity and Public 
Opposition to Foreign Direct Investment, BRITISH J. POL. SCI. (2017). 
 332. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Means and Ends of Corporate Governance, 97 NW. 
U. L. REV. 547 (2003) (outlining the controversy about the ends of corporate governance, the 
promotion of interests of shareholders or stakeholders, and about the best means to accomplish 
such ends, shareholder power or managerial power); Mariana Pargendler, The Corporate 
Governance Obsession, 42 J. CORP. L. 359 (2016) (describing the empirical ambiguities 
surrounding the effects of corporate governance practices). 
 333. Compare, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 
118 HARV. L. REV. 833 (2005) (defending the benefits of shareholder voice and contestable 
control structures) with Richard Squire & Zohar Goshen, Principal Costs: A New Theory for 
Corporate Law and Governance, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 67 (2017) (arguing that, in view of 
principal costs, entrenchment devices can maximize value in some circumstances). 
 334. See, e.g., Squire & Goshen, supra note 333 (criticizing “one-size-fits-all” solutions 
given the existence of heterogeneity among firms). 
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law rules entrenching domestic control can be subject to different rationalizations 
that help disguise a nationalist motivation.  
France, for instance, has been accused of pursuing “globalization à la carte” by 
supporting French firms’ acquisitions of foreign targets while opposing foreign 
acquisitions of French companies.335 Corporate law mechanisms are an attractive tool 
to carry out this strategy. While France’s system of tenured voting has a strong 
protectionist component, it can be easily justified as a means to promote long-term 
value.336  
The obfuscation provided by corporate law is obviously only partial.337 It is no 
secret that structural defenses like dual-class shares and cross-shareholdings can 
serve nationalist purposes and raise concerns about reciprocity. The barriers to 
takeovers posed by the keiretsu structure in Japan were a main policy concern in the 
1980s, featuring prominently in the “Structural Impediments Initiative” aimed at 
lifting informal barriers to foreign investment.338 However, the initiative did little to 
transform Japan’s economic and governance structure beyond some modest changes 
to competition law. The recognition of the protectionist role of corporate law also led 
to major policy initiatives in the European Union, though with only limited 
success.339  
Corporate law is not the only arena where stealth protectionism plays out. There 
is growing suspicion, and some evidence, that governments discriminate against 
foreign corporations through more rigorous enforcement of national regulatory 
standards—behavior that is also easily explained by the political deficit of foreigners 
(though one cannot rule out alternative explanations).340 Commentators often voice 
concerns that the enforcement of European Union and Chinese antitrust laws are 
motivated by nationalist considerations, as are Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) 
enforcement actions and hefty fines imposed by the United States on foreign 
financial institutions.341 For example, a study of U.S. criminal prosecutions found 
 
 
 335. Patrick Sabatier, Europe Faces Globalization – Part I: Wealthy Nations Practice 
Globalization à la Carte, by Pursuing Foreign Firms and Protecting Their Own, 
YALEGLOBAL ONLINE (May 16, 2006), https://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/europe-faces-
globalization-part-I [https://perma.cc/ALK7-SHA6]. 
 336. See MAZEAUD, supra notes 38.  
 337. The obfuscation of protectionist mechanisms is not unique to corporate law and FDI. 
See Daniel Y. Kono, Optimal Obfuscation: Democracy and Trade Policy Transparency, 100 
ANN. POL. SCI. REV. 369 (2006) (arguing that democracies adopt nontariff trade barriers for 
purposes of political obfuscation, given that voters tend to favor liberal trade policies that 
reduce prices and raise real incomes).  
 338. See Davies et. al., supra note 148 and accompanying text.  
 339. See supra Section I.E. 
 340. For instance, higher sanctions against foreign firms could be attributable to greater 
difficulty in monitoring and detection of wrongdoing or to nonobservable differences in the 
severity of the offense, or the quality of their defense and cooperation strategies.  
 341. See, e.g., Stephen J. Choi & Kevin E. Davis, Foreign Affairs and Enforcement of the 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 11 J. EMP. LEGAL STUD. 409 (2014) (finding that foreign 
companies are subject to higher sanctions for FCPA violations); John Engler, EU Has Gone 
Too Far Targeting US Companies, CNBC: BUS. NEWS (Feb. 24, 2016, 1:01 PM), 
https://www.cnbc.com/2016/02/24/eu-has-gone-too-far-targeting-us-companies-
commentary.html [https://perma.cc/E67K-CTQC]; Jean-Michel Quatrepoint, Au Nom de la 
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that foreign companies received fines that were on average seven times larger and 
made total payments over nine times larger than comparable domestic firms.342 By 
potentially increasing the costs of doing business abroad, such manifestations of 
regulatory nationalism through differential enforcement also has indirect 
implications for globalization and corporate governance.  
IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
The rise of trade liberalization and the internationalization of capital markets in 
the last three decades has triggered a lively argument about the implications of 
globalization for corporate law. This debate has two camps. Proponents of the 
convergence thesis argue that globalization will drive corporate laws towards greater 
shareholder protection and standardization.343 Defenders of the persistence thesis 
contend that, in view of path dependence and peculiarities in local politics, existing 
differences in corporate governance systems around the world will endure.344 The 
controversy about the direction of corporate governance change does not even 
contemplate other possible scenarios, such as convergence towards lesser investor 
protection, or the emergence of newly minted differences in corporate laws. 
Scholars also view the rise of foreign ownership in capital markets as an 
unambiguous force towards greater shareholder rights and uniformity in corporate 
governance practices.345 The argument, briefly, is that product market competition 
will put pressure on firms to lower their cost of capital. International competition for 
capital, in turn, will lead firms to offer more effective protections to investors. This 
will prompt jurisdictions to reform their laws to better protect outside shareholders, 
including foreign shareholders.  
This reasoning, however, fails to consider the import of national politics and, 
specifically, the political deficit of foreign investors. Even if markets are global, 
corporate lawmaking remains largely territorial. While both firms and countries 
indeed have incentives to attract foreign investors, their incentives can rapidly 
change once foreigners’ investment is sunk. It is well known in international affairs 
that foreign investors are subject to a hold-up problem. Economist Raymond Vernon 
famously described FDI as an “obsolescing bargain,” since “almost from the moment 
that the signatures have dried on the document, powerful forces go to work that 
quickly render the agreements obsolete in the eyes of the government.”346  
 
 
Loi . . . Américaine, LE MONDÉ DIPLOMATIQUE (Jan. 2017), https://www.monde-
diplomatique.fr/2017/01/QUATREPOINT/56965 [https://perma.cc/B846-QKKZ]. 
 342. BRANDON L. GARRETT, TOO BIG TO JAIL: HOW PROSECUTORS COMPROMISE WITH 
CORPORATIONS 220 (2014). But see Natalya Shnitser, A Free Pass for Foreign Firms? An 
Assessment of SEC and Private Enforcement Against Foreign Issuers, 119 YALE L.J. 1638, 
1693 (2009) (finding that the SEC was less likely to bring enforcement actions against foreign 
issuers compared to domestic issuers).  
 343. See, e.g., Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 2. 
 344. See, e.g., Bebchuk & Roe, supra note 13. 
 345. See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 2; Fox, supra note 12.  
 346. RAYMOND VERNON, SOVEREIGNTY AT BAY: THE MULTINATIONAL SPREAD OF U.S. 
ENTERPRISES 46–47 (1971). On the government incentives to expropriate foreign investors, 
see also David W. Leebron, A Game Theoretic Approach to the Regulation of Foreign Direct 
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The political pull to expropriate or otherwise abuse foreign investors is familiar.347 
This very prospect has prompted a complex network of bilateral investment treaties 
(BITs) to protect foreign investors from subsequent regulatory changes in the host 
country that diminish the value of their investment.348 In a similar vein, economists 
have recently argued that financial globalization increases governments’ incentive to 
default on sovereign debt because creditors are more likely to be foreign.349  
This view has clear, though thus far neglected, implications for the evolution of 
corporate governance. It suggests that, contrary to existing predictions, the rise of 
foreign investors will not inexorably lead to greater investor protection. Instead, 
when local capital markets become populated by foreign investors, the political 
economy may come to favor corporate arrangements that privilege domestic parties 
like managers, controlling shareholders, and workers, to the detriment of foreign 
investors. In this dynamic view of globalization, the result may be neither 
convergence nor persistence in corporate governance, but backlash against (foreign) 
shareholder-oriented practices. 
We are already reaching this stage in numerous jurisdictions. As depicted in Table 
1 below, foreign ownership has increased dramatically in recent years, though not to 
the same extent in all countries. From the early 1990s to the 2010s, the participation 
of foreign investors in local stock markets increased from approximately 5% to 18% 
in the United States, from 16% to nearly 60% in the United Kingdom, from 9% to 
56% in Germany, from 22% to 47% in France, from 8% to 27% in Japan, and from 
9% to 25% in Brazil. Consistent with the backlash hypothesis, legal and popular 
resistance to foreign takeovers have likewise increased. Commentators have 
described the recent rise of economic patriotism in France as “odd and incoherent” 
given France’s status as the E.U. leader as a recipient of FDI.350 However, the 
political deficit of foreigners and the hold-up problem facing foreign investors help 
explain how rising levels of FDI and foreign portfolio investment can instead fuel a 
nationalist response. 
 
  
 
 
Investment and the Multinational Corporation, 60 U. CIN. L. REV. 305, 313, 325 (1991). 
 347. See Amy Chua, The Privatization-Nationalization Cycle: The Link Between Markets 
and Ethnicity in Developing Countries, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 223, 226 (1995) (examining the 
cyclicality of economic liberalization and nationalistic backlash against both foreign investors 
and local ethnic minorities, which she terms “foreigners within”).  
 348. See supra note 300 and accompanying text.  
 349. Fernando Bromer & Jaume Ventura, Rethinking the Effects of Financial 
Globalization, 131 QUART. J. ECON. 1497 (2016).  
 350. Sabatier, supra note 335. 
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Table 1: Foreign Ownership as a Percentage of Stock Market Capitalization351  
There are other factors that fuel the tension between the rise of foreign ownership 
and continued market integration and strong shareholder rights. In its controversial 
decision in Citizens United v. FEC,352 the U.S. Supreme Court recognized the First 
Amendment rights of corporations to make political contributions. However, as the 
dissenting opinion by Justice Stevens and President Obama’s critique of the decision 
recognized, the ruling created an avenue for foreign interference in U.S. elections.353 
This undesirable outcome is becoming increasingly viable given the rising levels of 
foreign ownership of U.S. public firms.354 Yet, given the extension of First 
Amendment rights to business corporations, there is no easy way of avoiding this 
problem without discriminating against foreign-owned or controlled corporations 
and, in turn, restricting foreign ownership.355  
 
 
 351. Data for 2005 and 2015 come from World Bank 
(http://data.imf.org/regular.aspx?key=60587815) and IMF indicators (http://data.imf.org 
/regular.aspx?key=60587815) indicators. Data for 1994 come from different sources: U.S. 
Department of Treasury (United States); Office for National Statistics (United Kingdom); 
Tokyo Stock Exchange Shareownership Survey (Japan); GOUREVITCH & SHINN, supra note 
11, at 105 (France); Banco Central do Brasil and OECD (Brazil). 
 352. 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
 353. Id. at 465 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“Unlike voters in 
U.S. elections, corporations may be foreign controlled.”); see also President Barack Obama, 
State of the Union Address (Jan. 27, 2010) (“[L]ast week, the Supreme Court reversed a 
century of law that I believe will open the floodgates for special interests including foreign 
corporations to spend without limit in our elections.”). 
 354. See Table 1. 
 355. For a discussion of possible different responses to this concern, see Reuven S. Avi-
Yonah, Citizens United and the Corporate Form, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 999 (2010).  
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Fear of foreign investors is exacerbated when they have links to foreign 
governments. Concerns about sovereign wealth funds have led prominent corporate 
law scholars to propose their disenfranchisement (through, for example, the 
temporary suspension of voting rights held by SWFs) as a “minimalist” response to 
the potential “loss of sovereignty and distortion of markets.”356 However, potential 
political motives are not limited to state-controlled entities; individuals as well as 
politically-connected foreign private firms may exhibit them as well.357 
Consequently, this type of response risks changing the fabric of corporate law and 
governance.  
The existing regulatory framework is ill-equipped to deal with this problem. As 
previously mentioned, there is no multilateral framework applicable to foreign 
investments. The international coverage of BITs is broad but not universal. Most 
importantly, the application of BITs to changes in corporate laws is still untested and 
unclear. Corporate law changes tend to be general in scope and do not overtly 
discriminate against foreign investors. It is unlikely that most corporate law changes 
could qualify as an indirect expropriation that violates treaty guarantees of “fair and 
equitable treatment.” A related hurdle concerns proof of harm and causation. The 
multipurpose character of corporate law rules, as well as the existing uncertainty 
about the effects of different legal rules, makes it difficult to demonstrate and much 
less quantify the harm suffered by foreign investors from corporate law reforms. 
While the analysis in this Article focuses on the common influence of nationalism 
in the jurisdictions examined, it also reveals variation in their prevalence over time 
and place. Nationalist corporate laws have been less conspicuous in the United 
Kingdom and in the United States. Early industrialization, a robust financial sector, 
high levels of stock ownership by households, corporate lawmaking by courts and 
self-regulatory bodies, and the complementary institutions of a liberal market 
economy (such as an adaptable workforce and the use of market for intersectoral 
coordination) all serve as a relative buffer against nationalist corporate policies. By 
contrast, late industrialization, underdeveloped capital markets, fear of domination 
by a foreign superpower, and corporate lawmaking by legislatures facilitate the 
nationalist grip on corporate laws. Yet even the select set of “market-dominant small 
jurisdictions”—which command offshore finance by catering to the interests of 
foreign investors as a state strategy358—have their share of nationalist policies in 
certain areas, as illustrated by the protectionist corporate laws of Switzerland and the 
prevalence of state-owned enterprises in Singapore.  
 
 
 356. Ronald J. Gilson & Curtis J. Milhaupt, Sovereign Wealth Funds and Corporate 
Governance: A Minimalist Response to the New Mercantilism, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1345, 1369 
(2008). But see Richard Epstein & Amanda Rose, The Regulation of Sovereign Wealth Funds: 
The Virtues of Going Slow, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 111, 130 (2009) (attributing hostility to SWFs 
to “old-fashioned protectionism or, more generously, residual concern about the possible 
national security threats posed by foreign sovereign investment in the United States”).  
 357. For the argument that ownership is not dispositive of government influence in the 
Chinese context, see Curtis J. Milhaupt & Wentong Zheng, Beyond Ownership: State 
Capitalism and the Chinese Firm, 103 GEO. L.J. 665 (2015). 
 358. See CHRISTOPHER M. BRUNER, RE-IMAGINING OFFSHORE FINANCE: MARKET-
DOMINANT SMALL JURISDICTIONS IN A GLOBALIZING FINANCIAL WORLD (2016).  
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If the goal is to restrict the encroachment of nationalist objectives on corporate 
law and governance, a multilateral initiative for corporate law harmonization appears 
to be necessary but is not without challenges. It would inevitably entail the political 
trilemma of the world economy identified by Dani Rodrik, which makes it difficult 
to simultaneously satisfy the ideals of deep economic integration, nation-state 
sovereignty, and democratic politics.359 In the corporate law context, in particular, 
the project of promoting deep economic integration through the elimination of 
protectionist barriers faces distinct shortcomings.  
First, regulatory harmonization has significant disadvantages when firms and 
jurisdictions are heterogeneous and there is uncertainty about the optimal legal 
regime, as is the case in this area.360 Second, the harmonization project faces 
significant practical opposition since the same political coalition that favors 
nationalist corporate laws will oppose the liberalization of the legal regime at the 
international level. The political hurdles can be significant, as illustrated by the 
European Union’s disappointing experience with the Takeover Directive.  
A third and perhaps more fundamental challenge is conceptual. Legal instruments 
like poison pills and multivoting shares, while helpful in deterring foreign takeovers, 
can potentially serve other defensible objectives, such as increasing long-term 
investments. At this point, it is unclear that the drawbacks of nationalist corporate 
governance are sufficiently important to limit the availability of governance 
structures that reduce the contestability of control.  
More importantly, it is difficult to expunge the pursuit of nationalist objectives 
from corporate governance without altering the fabric of corporate law and modern 
capitalism. Even if there is sufficient consensus that the benefits of market 
integration justify a ban on takeover defenses such as poison pills and dual-class 
structures—as E.U. experts concluded in the early 2000s361—these measures do not 
guarantee the contestability of control in all contexts. As argued by Sweden and other 
jurisdictions at the time, various countries retain entrenched domestic control 
through majority ownership by private parties and the state, which remains unaltered 
by board neutrality and the breakthrough rule.  
One possible response would be to impose a modified breakthrough rule that 
imposes one vote per shareholder in the context of a tender offer, as was discussed 
in the E.U. context.362 This measure, however, is quite drastic in deviating from the 
general principle of proportionality between cash flow and voting rights, which is a 
core tenet of modern corporate law and for good reason. Moreover, even a modified 
breakthrough rule would not capture companies that are wholly owned, as many 
SOEs are.  
It is presently unclear whether the European Union’s fight against takeover 
restrictions has had a beneficial effect on market integration and corporate 
governance. The ECJ’s rejection of golden shares as an unreasonable restriction to 
the free movement of capital may have had the unintended consequences of 
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encouraging states to intervene by acquiring or maintaining stockholdings in 
corporations. This stronger form of intervention through state ownership not only 
allows for potentially greater interference on firm-level decisions but also furthers 
the nationalist-inspired reforms of general corporate laws, as in France’s stronger 
embrace of double-voting rights.363  
Interestingly, the recent Japan-European Union Partnership Agreement signed in 
July 2018, which aims at promoting both free trade and investment, boasts its unique 
character as the first international agreement containing provisions on corporate 
governance.364 The agreement covers areas such as shareholder rights, access to key 
information on the control or management of the company, board accountability and 
independence, and fair and transparent conditions for takeovers.365 It seems that the 
inclusion of such a corporate governance chapter seeks to mitigate precisely the 
problems identified in this Article: the use of corporate law as stealth 
protectionism366 and the need to protect foreign investors against reversals of existing 
levels of shareholder protection.367 While it is not clear that the generic provisions 
included in the Partnership Agreement are sufficient to accomplish these goals, this 
is certainly a notable development. Mitigating the grip of nationalism on corporate 
law is challenging, but possibly worthwhile, and certainly deserving of future 
consideration.  
CONCLUSION  
The grip of nationalism on corporate law shows how governance structures matter 
in ways that far surpass the agency cost considerations that dominate the literature. 
Even conventional stakeholder theories, which incorporate the interests of workers, 
consumers, and communities, may still be too narrow in focus. Corporate law serves 
as an instrument to maintain autarky or promote economic integration, choices that 
bear major economic repercussions. Continued international convergence towards 
investor protection is not certain, nor is stasis the only alternative; instead, backlash 
is a serious possibility. 
The bond between nationalism and corporate law has proven to be surprisingly 
durable. In the absence of a large-scale multilateral effort, the most serious threat to 
its persistence comes from the possible effacement of nationalism itself. Despite the 
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recent resentment against globalization, nationalist sentiment is arguably less 
pronounced than it was in previous historical periods.368 Emerging technological 
advances are likely to reduce the import of territorial boundaries that serve as the 
very foundation of nation-states.  
Moreover, a central premise of control nationalism is that controlling elites have 
strong ties of loyalty and shared interests with their home states. However, the rise 
of a global elite with a strong cosmopolitan orientation—whose members have more 
in common with one another than with their home-country neighbors—raises 
questions about the continued plausibility of this assumption.369 Lashkimi Mittal, the 
Indian founder and CEO of ArcelorMittal, lives in London, and so do many Russian 
oligarchs.370 Peter Thiel, a prominent Silicon Valley investor who was born in 
Germany, secured New Zealand citizenship after spending only 12 days in that 
country.371   
This cosmopolitan orientation of the emerging global elite is likely to affect not 
only places of residence but also corporate decisions. The surge in tax-driven changes 
of corporate domicile through “inversion” transactions—which imply a significant 
loss of tax revenue to the original home state—shows that the link between nation-
states and corporations are becoming increasingly tenuous.372 Even charitable 
contributions by today’s cosmopolitan elite are less focused on the donors’ country 
of origin.373  
Even if nation-states and nationalism may lose importance in the future, we are 
clearly not there yet. The prognoses about the irrelevance of corporate nationality in 
the 1990s turned out to be premature.374 So long as nationalism persists, its hold on 
corporate law and governance structures is likely to endure. This appreciation should 
inaugurate a new research agenda that incorporates the broader geopolitical and 
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developmental consequences of corporate law and its broader impact on the economy 
and society.  
